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Introduction
Once aware of its powerful impacts, the mobility of human beings becomes a fascinating
subject to analyze. From the personal point of view, a change of residence or a journey
to unknown regions is able to re-adjust one’s view on things and it can even bring about
major changes in life. From the bird’s eye perspective, the aggregated eﬀects of mobility can
sometimes be plainly stunning. The deep and far reaching consequences of the Migration
Period between the years 300 to 700 AD shaped the landscape of Europe (and other parts
of the world) as we know it by now. The rapid and continued growth of a city like Dhaka,
with its population skyrocketing from 2.2 million in 1975 to 13.5 million in 2007, will,
beyond any doubt, leave the picture of Bangladesh permanently changed.1 These are two
admittedly extreme examples. However, they pointedly illustrate how human mobility
constantly reshapes the reality we are living in. In Germany for instance, the share of
people who live in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants rose from 4.8% in 18712 to
30.9% in 2007.3 The UN documents similar actual trends for the developing countries, with
Africa and Asia having their shares of overall urban population more than doubled between
1950 and 2007.4 It is therefore little wonder that research on human migration behavior
1The UN predicts the population of Dhaka to be 22 million in 2025. See UN (2008), p. 11.
2See Ko¨llmann (1976).
3See Statistisches Bundesamt (2009), p. 40.
4See UN (2008), p. 5.
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has a long history in many diﬀerent scientiﬁc ﬁelds. Early works relevant to economics
are for instance Ravenstein’s (1885, 1889) “Laws of Migration”, and, even earlier, von
Thu¨nen’s (1826) “Der isolierte Staat”. In spite of so much time passed since then, the
issue remains a fascinating one. What is it that makes people move? What do particular
places like Tokyo or Mexico City oﬀer that tens of millions of people have decided to make
their homes there?
The answers to these questions are, of course, manifold. However, there is a bottom line
to any individual decision to move: At the very heart of it lies an expectation that the
destination oﬀers conditions that are, in some way or other, “better” than the status
quo. That said, one must distinguish many diﬀerent aspects of human migration behavior.
Large and sudden migration ﬂows are often triggered by drastic events like wars or famines.
The steady ﬂows from rural to urbanized areas observable in almost all countries in the
world are obviously distinct examples of the same phenomenon. A marked distinction
in the economics literature is the largely separate analysis of international and internal
migration.5 This division is somewhat startling as there is no obvious reason to assume a
priori that the underlying motives of migration diﬀer between both cases. More likely, it is
the cost of migration – in the most general sense of the word – that distinguishes crossing
national borders from moving within them from an individual point of view.
Speaking of gains and costs we enter the economic point of view, where the location de-
cisions of households are usually seen as market outcomes. Von Thu¨nen (1826) explained
land rents and the location choice of rational individuals by the cost of agricultural pro-
duction and the distance to the central market place. In the same spirit, the seminal
works of Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), and Mills (1972) established the framework of the
monocentric city. The individual location choice in models of this tradition is determined
by trade oﬀs between wages, housing costs, and the economic cost of commuting. Beyond
5See Cushing and Poot (2004).
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these economic factors, the local quality of life, a notion subsuming the bundle of locally
available amenities, was found to play a crucial role in the household’s location choice.6 In
the tradition of Tiebout (1956), local attractiveness is largely owed to local governments
that provide public services and impose taxes. Accordingly, he coined the view that migra-
tion is a form of people voting with their feet. Common to all these studies is the economic
view that in migration equilibrium all relevant factors balance out, such that individual
utility is equal across locations.
This dissertation consists of four self-contained empirical essays. Each of the essays tries to
make a moderate contribution to the understanding of internal migration ﬂows in Germany.
Chapters 1 and 2 follow the tradition of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) and investigate
the impact of local attributes on migration. Both chapters pursue the hedonic approach to
measure such eﬀects and have their focus on land prices. Chapters 3 and 4 both draw on
the implications of the monocentric city model and concentrate on the relation between less
densely populated regions and agglomerations. In this context, Chapter 3 examines the
spatial eﬀects of minimum wages. Chapter 4 employs a discrete choice model to analyze
the household’s location and commuting decisions.
Germans have a reputation to show great emotional attachment to their home regions and
therefore lack mobility. Notwithstanding such conjectures, there is a sizeable degree of
mobility observable in the country. Oﬃcial statistics on domestic migration reveal that
the total number of internal immigrants crossing the borders of German States (La¨nder)
in 2005 was 1.07 million (i. e. 0.013 immigrants p. c.). Moves within the boundaries of
the La¨nder even amounted to 2.58 million in 2005.7 For comparison, the domestic in-
migration over regional borders (NUTS-2 regions) in 2005 amounted to 0.33 million in
6As for instance in Graves (1976, 1979), Rosen (1979), or Roback (1982).
7Excluding moves within communities. See Statistisches Bundesamt (2007), p. 60, for the German
ﬁgures.
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Italy (i. e. 0.006 immigrants p. c.), 0.49 million in Spain (i. e. 0.011 immigrants p. c.), and
0.26 million in the Netherlands (i. e. 0.016 immigrants p. c.).8 For the same year, the US
Census Bureau (2006) reports a number of 1.16 million domestic migrants crossing State
borders within the USA (i. e. 0.004 immigrants p. c.). Unfortunately, the size diﬀerences
of these geographical entities are too large with respect to area and population to allow for
direct comparisons. Nevertheless, the per capita ﬁgures suggest that domestic migration
in Germany is not exceptionally small, at least not in the European context. Further
evidence on household mobility in Germany is presented in Table 1. The total sum of
internal migrants per 1,000 inhabitants in the German La¨nder in 2004 varies between 45.9
in Berlin and 80.4 in Schleswig-Holstein. The net-inﬂows per 1,000 inhabitants range from
-6.1 in Sachsen-Anhalt to 3.9 in Schleswig-Holstein in 2004. The pronounced population
shift from East to West Germany also becomes clear in Figure 1, where the net-inﬂows per
1,000 inhabitants are depicted at the county-level. Apart from the East – West migration,
the map highlights particularly high inﬂows into the surrounding areas of urban centers
like Berlin, Hamburg, or Munich.
Recalling the above stated motivation for migration, these shifts point at substantial dif-
ferences in living conditions in Germany. Chapter 1 of this dissertation addresses the
diﬀerences in the local quality of life across Germany. To do so, the hedonic approach
pioneered by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) is applied to land-price and wage diﬀerences
between the German counties. Even though this approach is well established in the USA,
the concept has, to the best of my knowledge, so far not been applied to Germany. The
investigation provides important insights into people’s valuation of issues like crime, air
quality, and local labor market conditions. It therefore provides regional as well as na-
tional policy makers with useful information about the actual perception and composition
of quality of life. Starting point of the analysis is a simple spatial equilibrium model with
8All ﬁgures from the Eurostat database.
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Figure 1: Domestic Migration in Germany
Net in-migration at the county level in 2004. Source: BBR (2006)
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diﬀerent locations, each of them providing distinct quantities of (dis-)amenities. As house-
holds and ﬁrms are assumed to be mobile between locations, spatial equilibrium requires
that there exists no further arbitrage opportunity by moving. Thus, regional housing costs
and wages will adjust according to the respective amenity levels at each location. To
quantify these compensating diﬀerentials, the empirical analysis employs data from the
“Perspektive Deutschland” study 2004, a large survey on a wide range of social and po-
litical issues among more than half a million Germans,9 along with data on climate and
oﬃcial statistics. Hedonic regressions of wages and land prices are estimated to infer the
marginal willingness to pay for regional attributes. The results show that regional dif-
ferences in amenities do capitalize into land prices and explain a substantial part of the
observed land-price variation across counties. With regard to wages, however, only little
eﬀects of amenities are found. According to the implied implicit prices of the amenities,
quality-of-life diﬀerences are mainly driven by two sets of attributes. The ﬁrst refers to
geographical conditions, leisure facilities, and tourism-related amenities. The second set
relates to local labor market conditions. Following Blomquist et al. (1988), a quality of
life index for all German counties is derived, based on the highly signiﬁcant land-market
eﬀects of amenities. The index indicates that in West Germany the southern regions rank
highest, particularly those in the Munich area, as well as counties in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
The regions in the East show less pronounced diﬀerences in the quality of life, which to
some extent reﬂects consistent labor market diﬃculties.
Chapter 2 is closely related to the ﬁrst, as it also employs the hedonic approach to inves-
tigate the willingness to pay for regional attributes. However, it shifts the focus to public
services provided at the community level and explicitly accounts for spill-over eﬀects and
spatial dependence. Unlike the counties analyzed in the ﬁrst chapter, the German commu-
nities are not just administrative units. They represent the smallest entity in the German
9This study was initiated and conducted by McKinsey corporation. For an overview of the project see
Fassbender and Kluge (2006).
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federal structure and their elected governments dispose of substantial autonomy with re-
spect to taxation and public spending. Objects of investigation are the 505 municipalities
of the Free State of Saxony. Located in East Germany, this state has experienced a massive
outﬂow of people after the reuniﬁcation. A reliable measurement of the citizen’s valuation
of public services is therefore especially relevant at the community level, and it is almost
vital for East German municipalities in particular. The empirical analysis uses data from
a variety of sources. Due to a lack of reliable data on wages at the community level, the
analysis is constrained to compensatory diﬀerentials on the market for real estate and does
not consider the full general equilibrium model proposed by Roback (1982). Given the
minor spatial extension of most communities, one must consider possible spill-over eﬀects
of local attributes. Residents of neighboring municipalities are likely to enjoy not only the
amenities provided in their home community but also those in their surroundings. The
estimation explicitly accounts for such spill-over eﬀects by including spatial lags of the vari-
ables that capture public services and amenities. Moreover, possible spatial dependence
in the error terms is taken into account to ensure correct statistical inference. The results
show that most of the included public services do signiﬁcantly capitalize into land prices,
with the quality of public transport systems and the share of land dedicated to recreational
purposes receiving the highest valuation by Saxony’s citizens. The conjecture that local at-
tributes also aﬀect land prices in adjacent communities is conﬁrmed as almost all spatially
lagged indicators enter the estimation signiﬁcantly. Again, the public transport system
and recreational land in surrounding communities are found to have the highest hedonic
prices. In general, substantial parts of the variation in land prices across communities can
be explained by the employed set of variables.
Column 5 of Table 1 indicates that job migration accounts for large parts of total migration.
Particularly interesting are the high net inﬂows into the cities of Hamburg and Berlin, in
contrast to the large net outﬂows from the least densely populated states Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern and Sachsen-Anhalt.
Introduction XVII
Chapter 3 investigates the implications of regional diﬀerences in population density for
labor-market policies, more precisely, for minimum wages. Such wage limits have recently
been subject of extensive political discussion in Germany. This comes as no surprise as
they represent an attractive policy tool: Minimum wages are apparently targeted at ﬁghting
poverty, thus earning public respect at a direct cost that seems low. However, by its simple
structure a uniform minimum wage disregards all sorts of wage structures that may exist.
This includes not only wage diﬀerences associated with skills, occupation, experience, and
gender, but also diﬀerences with regard to industry, ﬁrm-size, and region. The analysis
concentrates on the latter point, proposing that a minimum wage is much more restrictive
at the countryside than it is for workers in cities. Exploiting data from the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB), the study shows that a uniform minimum wage would
indeed aﬀect regional labor markets quite distinctly. In particular, the share of workers
that will be directly aﬀected by the minimum wage is higher in rural counties as compared
to cities and urban counties. Further empirical analysis shows that these rural – urban
wage diﬀerences are mainly due to systematic spatial diﬀerences in wages. These results
are shown to be robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and estimation techniques. Motivated by
these empirical ﬁndings, the consequences of the introduction of a uniform minimum wage
in a stylized theoretical model are explored. In the spatial equilibrium model, a spatial
wage distribution arises due to productivity diﬀerences and housing costs. Imposing a
uniform minimum wage exerts distortive eﬀects on the spatial structure of the economy.
In particular, employment and population will rise in the more densely populated regions,
implying that wages of the working population in the cities might even fall. Moreover, the
population of cities would also suﬀer from an increase in housing costs. A welfare analysis
shows that the group of workers that beneﬁt from the minimum wage cannot compensate
the others.
As outlined above, the monocentric city model incorporates commuting distance as an
elementary factor of the household’s location decision. In fact, commuting plays a special
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role as it allows households to live and work at distinct locations. The ﬁndings of Chapter 3
on the spatial wage structure in Germany indicate that this might be of particular interest
in the context of urban centers and their less densely populated surroundings. A look
at Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 clearly conﬁrms this conjecture as it articulately illustrates
the importance of urban centers for commuting patterns in Germany. Further evidence
is provided by the outstandingly high ﬁgures on net in-commuting into the city states
Hamburg and Bremen given in column 8 of Table 1.
Chapter 4 focuses precisely on this suburb – center relation and provides a comprehen-
sive empirical analysis of the interplay of wages, housing costs, and commuting costs in
the household’s location choice. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 1 give an impression of the
substantial magnitudes involved when talking about commuting in Germany. After all,
not less than 85% of German employees considered themselves to be commuters in 2004.10
As mentioned before, economic theory identiﬁes four main determinants of the location
decision of individuals: Wages, housing costs, commuting costs, and the local quality of
life. Thus, by incorporating commuting costs, Chapter 4 completes the economic analysis
of household mobility in Germany that is conducted in this dissertation. The combined
impact of these economic factors on the individual location decision is empirically quan-
tiﬁed by the use of a discrete choice model. The analysis thereby focuses on the relation
between a central urban area and its surrounding nonmetropolitan area, and examines the
choice of four alternatives: To live and work in the metropolitan area; To live and work
in the nonmetropolitan area; To live in the metropolitan area and commute to the non-
metropolitan area; To live in the nonmetropolitan area and work in the metropolitan area.
Objects of investigation are the regional labor markets constituted by the urban centers
of the largest German cities Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich. A mixed logit approach is
employed where coeﬃcients are allowed to vary randomly over decision makers instead of
10See Statistisches Bundesamt (2005).
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being constant. This estimation strategy avoids problems involved with the restrictive in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, as well as with possible correlation
of utility over the four alternatives. The results clearly conﬁrm the predictions of economic
theory with respect to the important roles of wages, housing costs, and commuting costs
in the individual location decision. Moreover, the ﬁndings indicate a considerable degree
of variation in the households’ valuation of commuting- and housing costs. Estimated
elasticities show how changes in wages, housing costs, or commuting time aﬀect the dis-
tribution of households between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. No systematic
diﬀerences in the magnitude of the impacts between the three factors are found. The
quantitative implications of the results are illustrated by simulation of two counterfactual
scenarios. The scenarios aim at emulating the impacts of the planned cut in the German
“Entfernungspauschale” in 2007 and of the introduction of a minimum wage as discussed in
Chapter 3. Further results include the calculation of changes in consumer surplus induced
by changes in wages, housing costs, and commuting costs.
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Abstract∗
In order to assess diﬀerences in living conditions across German regions we apply the
hedonic approach of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) to land-price and wage diﬀerences
across Germany’s counties. Employing a recent survey of more than half a million Germans
on a wide range of social and political issues we conﬁrm that diﬀerences in amenities give
rise to substantial diﬀerences in land prices. With regard to wages, however, we ﬁnd only
little eﬀects of amenities. Relying on the land-price eﬀects we assess the quality of life in
each of the German counties and provide a comprehensive ranking.
1.1 Introduction
Diﬀerences in living conditions, land prices, and in the quality of life always capture a lot
of attention by citizens and local governments in Germany as well as in other countries of
the world. However, there has been little research on this issue in Germany as compared
to the US, for example. This could well be due to a lower degree of household mobility.
The neglect of those issues is, however, disturbing since the German systems of local
public ﬁnance and ﬁscal federalism place a lot of emphasis on attempts to equalize living
conditions across regions. Moreover, since sub-national governments consume a rather large
fraction of the public sector’s budget in Germany, there is much need of an evaluation of
sub-national government policies and their impact on the quality of life.
Several attempts have been made to assess and compare regional growth and labor market
situations and many more possibly relevant indicators of living conditions in Germany
(e. g., Prognos, 2004). However, an objective assessment of living conditions faces not
only substantial problems in collecting information, it also would have to make rather
arbitrary assumptions about how diﬀerent regional characteristics can be aggregated in
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Thiess Bu¨ttner. It is based on our paper “Quality of Life in
the Regions: Results for German Counties,” Annals of Regional Science, 43(1), 2009.
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order to obtain a comprehensive assessment. Given the substantial diﬃculties involved we
apply a market-based, hedonic, approach where problems of both, gathering information
as well as aggregating regional characteristics, are solved using the revealed willingness
to pay. The hedonic approach, pioneered by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), utilizes
diﬀerences in land prices and wages across regions to infer the marginal willingness to
pay for regional attributes including quantity and quality of public services. Based on
corresponding estimates we follow Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) and generate an
index of the quality of life across German regions.
To the best of our knowledge no attempt has been made so far to apply this concept to
German regions. This might be due to the lack of information about regional character-
istics, in particular with regard to hard-to-measure public services and amenities such as
safety, education, or the facilities for leisure activities. For this study we utilize a large,
almost untapped, data source, the “Perspektive Deutschland” study 2004/2005,1 a recent
survey among more than half a million households on a wide range of social and political
issues, and combine this with county-level data from a variety of other sources.
Our results show that, indeed, diﬀerences in amenities and disamenities do capitalize into
land prices and can be used to predict a substantial part of observed land-price diﬀerences
across regions, supporting the hedonic approach. With regard to wages, however, we ﬁnd
only little eﬀects of amenities. Nevertheless, relying on the land-market eﬀects of amenities
a quality of life indicator is computed which ranks cities and counties. The results indicate
that among the West German regions the southern regions rank highest. The regions in
the East show less pronounced diﬀerences in the quality of life which to some extent reﬂects
consistent labor market diﬃculties.
1This study was initiated and conducted by McKinsey corporation. For an overview of the project see
Fassbender and Kluge (2006).
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The paper proceeds as follows. The following section derives the underlying theoretical
model. Section 3 brieﬂy describes the data. Section 4 discusses the investigation approach.
Section 5 presents the results from hedonic land-price and income regressions. Section 6 is
concerned with the implicit prices and the quality of life index. Section 7 provides a short
summary.
1.2 Theoretical Background
This section brieﬂy reviews the basic approach to the estimation of quality of life developed
by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982). For an excellent overview see Blomquist (2006). Con-
sider a spatial equilibrium model with several jurisdictions. Each provides speciﬁc quan-
tities of (dis-) amenities. Land is scarce such that mobile households and ﬁrms compete
for locations with high levels of amenities (low levels of disamenities). Spatial equilibrium
requires household utility and production costs to be equal across jurisdictions such that
there is no further arbitrage opportunity by moving. Therefore, housing costs and wages
have to adjust according to the respective amenity levels at each location.
Let us assume that households have identical preferences and oﬀer one unit of labor, each.
They earn the regional wage rate 푤푗 and consume housing ℎ푗 and a tradable good, which
serves as a numeraire. For simplicity, we further assume that the price of one unit of housing
is equal to the land rent 푟푗. Utility maximization yields an indirect utility function with the
usual properties. It characterizes the combinations of private consumption and amenities
for which households are indiﬀerent between locations
푢∗ = 푉
⎛⎜⎝푤푗 − 푟푗︸ ︷︷ ︸
푥푗
, 퐴푗
⎞⎟⎠ , (1.1)
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where private consumption 푥푗 is determined by the household budget constraint, 푥푗 =
푤푗 − 푟푗, and 퐴푗 denotes the vector of (dis-)amenities 푎푗,푖 at location 푗. (Dis-)amenities
increase (decrease) household utility according to
∂푉 (푤푗 − 푟푗, 퐴푗)
∂푎푗,푖
> (<) 0.
Firms produce the numeraire using local labor and land. Proﬁt maximization requires that
the unit cost are equal to the price of the numeraire such that
1 = 푐 (푤푗, 푟푗, 퐴푗) , (1.2)
where 푐 is the unit cost function. A regional attribute 푎푗,푖 also can be a production (dis-)
amenity, depending on its eﬀect on the unit cost:
∂푐 (푤푗, 푟푗, 퐴푗)
∂푎푗,푖
< (>) 0.
Spatial equilibrium is characterized by a combination of wages and rents which solves both
equations simultaneously. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 1.1. For a given level
of amenities 퐴1 in region 1, all combinations of wages and housing prices that leave the
household indiﬀerent with regard to other regions are located on the lower upward sloping
line. Unit costs for the same set of attributes 퐴1 are depicted by the lower downward
sloping line. The intersection at point a determines the equilibrium levels of housing price
푟1 and wage rate 푤1. The second set of curves refers to region 2 which is more attractive
for households in the sense that it has more amenities and less disamenities. Formally, this
case is characterized by the requirement that
푎2,푖 > 푎1,푖 if
∂푉 (푤푗 − 푟푗, 퐴푗)
∂푎푗,푖
> 0, and vice versa.
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As a consequence, the iso-utility curve shifts up. The consequence for wages depends
on whether the amenities have also eﬀects on productivity. If there are no eﬀects the
equilibrium would be at intersection point b. In this case, land rents would be higher but
wages would be reduced to maintain cost-competitiveness. The positive impact on land
prices is often referred to as (cross-sectional) capitalization of amenities into the land price.
Note, however, that capitalization is only partial, as wages adjust.
However, it may well be the case that amenities have productivity eﬀects. Consider the
case of positive productivity eﬀects of amenities and negative productivity eﬀects of dis-
amenities, such that
푎2,푖 > 푎1,푖 if
∂푐 (푤푗, 푟푗, 퐴푗)
∂푎푗,푖
< 0, and vice versa.
Then, region 2 would be able to pay a higher land rent at the going wage rate, in other
words, the iso-cost curve shifts up – the higher cost–competitiveness would show up in
higher land-rents. Thus, due to the productivity eﬀects the land-rent would be further
increased. The impact on the wage rate now becomes ambiguous and we might even have
a higher wage rate in equilibrium as depicted by intersection point c.
Wage and land-price eﬀects can be used to obtain an implicit price for each amenity 푓푖. To
see this, diﬀerentiate equation (1.1) and make use of the mobility assumption to obtain:
∂푉
∂푥푗
푑푤푗 − ∂푉
∂푥푗
푑푟푗 +
∂푉
∂푎푗,푖
푑푎푗,푖 = 0.
Rearranging yields the implicit price of amenity 푖
푓푖 ≡ ∂푉
∂푎푗,푖
/
∂푉
∂푥푗
=
푑푟푗
푑푎푗,푖
− 푑푤푗
푑푎푗,푖
. (1.3)
This expression indicates that the marginal assessment of an amenity can be obtained from
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Figure 1.1: Land Rent and Wage Rate in Spatial Equilibrium
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the price responses of the rental price of land and the wage rate.
Given information about price responses to each of the amenities we can construct a
weighted average representing the quality of life index. The index is calculated in a straight-
forward manner by summing over all amenities using the implicit prices as weights:
푄푂퐿푗 =
∑
푖
푓푖푎푖푗. (1.4)
Based on the theory, 푄푂퐿푗 is an estimate of the willingness to pay for the bundle of
amenities and disamenities in region 푗.
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1.3 Investigation Approach
To obtain empirical estimates of capitalization into land prices and income eﬀects of each
amenity, we estimate hedonic land-price and income regressions.
In a ﬁrst step, we regress the natural logarithm of average regional land prices on our set
of regional (dis-)amenities:
ln 푟푗 = 훽0 + 훽1푧푗 + 훽2퐴푗 + 휀푗, (1.5)
where 푧푗 is a vector of land-market characteristics and 퐴푗 is the set of (dis-)amenities in
region 푗. However, note that there are no a-priori restrictions imposed on the parameters.
In other words, we do not postulate that a region characteristic is perceived as an amenity
or as a disamenity for households and/or ﬁrms. 푧푗 captures control variables related to
variations in the location rent as suggested by standard models of the urban land market
(see DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996). This includes population density as the main deter-
minant of the location rent within metropolitan and urban areas and population growth
as an indicator of the expected change in the location rent.
In a second step, we model the log of monthly net household income reported by full-time
employed respondents as a function of individual characteristics like gender, education,
job, etc., the number of adult household members as well as of our set of regional
(dis-)amenities. The regression equation models the income of household 푘 in region 푗:
ln푤푘,푗 = 훼0 + 훼1푥푘 + 훼2퐴푗 + 훼3푧푗 + 휀푘, (1.6)
where 푥푘 is a vector of individual characteristics. Since data on household income is
reported in income classes we use the means of these classes to construct the left-hand
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variable. Estimation is done using weighted least squares to take account of the sampling
weights of the various types of respondents in the survey dataset. As micro data at the
household level are combined with aggregate data at the regional level, inference is based on
heteroscedasticity and group-correlation consistent standard errors. While the theoretical
model relies on the strong assumption of perfect mobility, we experiment with diﬀerent
groups of households to identify possible eﬀects of diﬀerences in household mobility.
In a third step, the coeﬃcients (훼2, 훽2) obtained are converted into implicit prices for the
amenities. For this purpose, with regard to the land-price regression we need to convert the
prices per sqm into monthly spending by households. To do so, we multiply the marginal
land-price eﬀect of each amenity by a factor ℎ, which represents an estimate of the monthly
housing cost associated with a land price of e 1 per squared meter.2 The implicit price of
amenity 푖 follows from equation (1.3).
As the coeﬃcients obtained from the hedonic regressions (1.5) and (1.6) are subject to
considerable variation in their statistical signiﬁcance we calculate standard errors for the
implicit prices. For this purpose, we employ a Monte-Carlo simulation approach. Techni-
cally, we randomly draw 1,000 observations of each amenity coeﬃcient from a multivariate
normal distribution with an underlying variance-covariance structure equivalent to that of
the respective estimation. We then apply the calculations as described above and ﬁnally
get a mean value for each implicit price and its corresponding standard deviation.
2We use a ﬁgure of ℎ = .53, which is obtained as follows: we ﬁrst obtain an estimate of the average lot
size used for a housing unit: for this purpose we multiply the average lot size (752.8 sqm) with 0.25 which
is an estimate of the share of land typically consumed by the structure following Viejo Garcia (2003). In
a second step we divide this ﬁgure by an average number of housing units per structure (1.479) taken
from the Statistical Yearbook (2006). In the last step we transform each euro of land value per sqm into
monthly cost by ﬁxing the rate of interest at 0.05 and dividing by 12.
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1.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
While the above approach has been applied several times to US data, to the best of our
knowledge no attempt has been made so far to apply the quality of life concept to German
regions. This study is concerned with the county-level in Germany which comprises 116
unincorporated cities, sometimes referred to as urban counties, and 323 counties. The
latter are larger administrative units incorporating, on average, 38 municipalities.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for land prices, household income, amenities, and
control variables. The data is obtained from a variety of sources. Data on land prices
comes from the German federal and regional statistical oﬃces and refers to transactions of
land available for construction. Land prices are calculated as average prices per sqm sold
in 2001 – 2003 in each county.3
Data on household income as well as on several amenities is based on the “Perspektive
Deutschland” study 2004, a large survey among more than half a million Germans. It
reports opinions and valuations of German residents concerning a variety of aspects of life
in Germany and the German regions, respectively. Along with this information, the data
set contains information on household income, age, education, local neighborhood, job,
etc. Representativeness is ensured by sampling weights drawn from a parallel ﬁeld-survey
with more than 10,000 participants. The regression analysis of the wage equation as well
as the aggregation of survey responses at regional level both take account of these sampling
weights to correct for participation bias.
Information on monthly household income is reported in eleven income intervals (see Ap-
pendix) net of taxes and including transfers. In order to reduce possible problems with
3Most data points are three-year averages. However, some data is missing for privacy reasons and we
use 2004 land prices to obtain three- or at least two-year averages where possible.
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the diﬀerences in hours worked we focus on full-time employed individuals in our analysis.
We use the means of each income class as dependent variable in our hedonic income esti-
mation. However, the highest interval is top-coded, i. e. it has no explicit upper bound.
We therefore follow Cowell (2000) and assume that the distribution of household income
is Paretian over the highest two intervals. Fitting the distribution to our data gives an
estimate of the Paretian shape parameter 푎 > 1, which allows us to obtain an estimate of
the mean of the highest income class.4
To capture the residents’ living conditions we use data from the same survey and compute
indicators of the assessment of the region in terms of security and crime, education, cultural
and leisure facilities, the local market for labor, as well as accessibility and traﬃc conditions.
In the survey, these variables show the value 1 if the participant considers the aspect
in question as being one of the four most urgent problems to be dealt with in her/his
residential region. For our purposes, the individual assessments are aggregated at the
county level. To facilitate interpretation we recode the variables, such that our regressors
take values between zero and one, where a higher value indicates a better situation or less
need for improvement (except for crime, where a higher value indicates a worse situation).
Formally, we aggregate over individual assessments of amenity 푖 in region 푗 by
1∑푛푗
푘=1 w푘,푗
푛푗∑
푘=1
w푘,푗
(
“Urgent problem”푘,푗,푖 = 0
)
,
where 푖 refers to the variables leisure facilities, accessibility, education, and local labor
market, and w푘,푗 is the respondent’s sampling weight. “urgent problem”푘,푗,푖 = 0 indicates
that respondent 푘 from region 푗 considers 푖 not to be an urgent problem.5 An additional
4We obtain a shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of the highest two intervals of 푎 = 5.04,
resulting in a mean of the highest income class of 푤ˆ = 7484.62. For the sample of mobile households we
have 푎 = 5.03 and 푤ˆ = 7487.85. See Cowell (2000), p.156f, for more details.
5To obtain an indicator for crime we simply sum whether the respondent is considering crime as an
urgent problem.
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labor market indicator is designed speciﬁcally to capture the existence of job alternatives
within the region. This indicator captures the individuals’ expectations of whether an
adequate job would be found in the region in case of job loss. The individual response
takes the value unity if the answer is yes and zero otherwise. Individual assessments are
aggregated simply as the weighted sum
1∑푛푗
푘=1 w푘,푗
푛푗∑
푘=1
w푘,푗
(
“Altern. job opportunities exist”푘,푗 = 1
)
,
where “Altern. job opportunities exist”푘,푗 = 1 indicates that respondent 푘 from region 푗
expects to ﬁnd an alternative job opportunity.
Further amenity data relates to climate and environment. The data on sunshine comes
from the Federal Meteorological Oﬃce (“Deutscher Wetterdienst”). It reports the average
annual duration of sunshine in 2004 in 100 hours measured at one observatory in each
county. Data on industry emissions stems from federal and states’ statistical oﬃces and
utilizes information about the average emission of CH4, NOx and SO2 particles in 27 in-
dustry branches on a per-worker basis. For each county, we calculate total emission in tons
per sqkm using local employment in these industries. Further variables capture the area
covered by forests or water as a fraction of total county area. Another variable reports
the number of overnight stays and is used to capture regions specialized in tourism. Some
further variables capture possible advantages from living in or close to metropolitan areas
which might relate not only to productivity advantages of agglomerations but also to con-
sumption advantages.6 Metropolitan area is a binary variable reﬂecting the classiﬁcation
of the Federal Bureau of Regional Planning (“Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumord-
nung”). An indicator of the peripherality is taken from the same source and reports the
average travel time to the next three agglomeration centers in minutes. Finally, as an
6For a discussion see Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2007).
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indicator of social problems, a local poverty variable is added capturing the number of
welfare recipients per resident.
Moreover, we use a couple of control variables. In the land price regressions, population
density and population growth are used to capture diﬀerences in the location rent and are
obtained from the states’ statistical oﬃces. The analysis of cross-sectional income diﬀer-
ences includes several individual characteristics following the standard Mincer-type wage
regression at the individual level. This includes indicators of nationality, family status,
gender, age, and education. A further variable captures the size of the household of the
respondent. In order to make sure that the speciﬁc situation in eastern Germany does not
aﬀect the results we include a binary variable for counties in the eastern part of the country
capturing the former German Democratic Republic and Berlin. Since unincorporated cities
and counties are diﬀerent administrative units we also include a binary variable which is
unity for rural counties (as opposed to urban counties). Furthermore, an interaction term
is added capturing the city/county diﬀerence in the eastern part of the country.
1.5 Regression Results
Table 1.2 reports the results of hedonic regressions of land prices and household income on
the set of amenities. The results for the land-price regressions are reported in Column (1).
Except for education and the dummies for metropolitan area and rural county, all amenities
show a signiﬁcant impact on the log of the land price. The signs are as expected: the price
for land is higher in regions with more sunshine, more appeal to tourists, or good traﬃc
connections, whereas high levels of industry emissions or perceived crime tend to reduce
the price. Strong eﬀects are also exerted from the local labor market conditions and the
existence of alternative job opportunities within the region – the positive coeﬃcients of the
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Survey data “Perspektive Deutschland”
Leisure facilities .784 .071 .523 .957
Crime .185 .076 .032 .480
Accessibility .720 .126 .275 .973
Education .694 .067 .481 .883
Local labor market .272 .158 .006 .724
Altern. job opport. .097 .049 .002 .254
Household income 2456 5.91 250 7485
HH income (mobile sample) 2491 7.69 250 7488
County characteristics
Sunshine 16.2 1.19 10.5 18.9
Industry emissions 6.06 9.97 .061 80.2
Share of forest 27.4 15.2 .800 64.8
Share of water 2.48 3.07 .200 28.8
Tourism 4.48 6.50 .200 76.9
Met.area .352 .478 0 1
Peripherality 104 38.3 24 258
Poverty 29.3 16.2 3.50 118.5
East .256 .437 0 1
Rural .733 .443 0 1
Rural x East .194 .396 0 1
Population growth .535 6.05 -25 19.4
Density 5.08 6.55 .398 40.2
Land price 119 111 15.0 979
See text for description. Statistics for 438 counties. Figures on individual household
income are weighted and refer to 211216 weighted observations in the full sample and
127828 weighted observations in the sample of mobile households, respectively.
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respective variables are highly signiﬁcant. The overall predictive power of the regression
is quite good: about 90% of observed diﬀerences in the land price across German counties
can be predicted from the local amenities and further controls.
The results from the income regression are provided in Column (2). Note that the estimates
are obtained from a weighted-least squares approach where individual observations are
weighted with the sampling probability. The Mincer-type variables show highly signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients with the expected sign for all of the individual characteristics. However, the
amenity variables prove mostly insigniﬁcant. Only the labor-market situation shows a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect.7 While this is at odds with the existence of compensating wage
diﬀerentials it should not be overemphasized since respondents may take the regional wage
level into account when assessing the local labor market conditions. Moreover, the second
labor market indicator which is more precisely asking for job opportunities is not signiﬁcant.
A signiﬁcant positive eﬀect is obtained only for the indicator for metropolitan areas which
possibly points at some agglomeration eﬀects.8
Note that the dummy for eastern German counties remains signiﬁcantly negative in both
regressions. This indicates that the diﬀerentials in land prices and income between western
and eastern Germany cannot be fully explained by amenity diﬀerences or by diﬀerences in
the labor-market situation. This might point to some omitted amenities favoring West Ger-
many’s regions. However, an alternative explanation might relate to transition problems
in the East.
Since the data on land prices used in this study reﬂect actual transactions of land ready
7The insigniﬁcance of population growth might reﬂect some simultaneity bias due to correlation be-
tween population growth and the wage level. However, the results from alternative regressions where the
population growth variable is omitted do not show major diﬀerences with regard to the other coeﬃcients.
8The size of the coeﬃcient points at an urban income premium of about 3%. Lehmer and Mo¨ller (2007)
ﬁnd a wage premium of 8%. However, note that our study is concerned with household income net of
taxes and including transfers.
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Table 1.2: Regression Results
log Landprice (e /sqm) log Household Inc. (net)
Variable (1) (2)
Region Characteristics
Leisure facilities 1.55 ★★★ (.279) .103 (.057)
Crime -.815★★ (.266) -.054 (.045)
Accessibility .664 ★★★ (.155) -.044 (.036)
Education .034 (.250) .008 (.061)
Local labor market 1.03 ★★★ (.209) .201 ★★★ (.038)
Altern. job opport. 2.09 ★★★ (.542) .090 (.108)
Sunshine .038★★ (.012) .004 (.003)
log Ind. emissions -.086★★ (.030) -.001 (.006)
Share of forest .006 ★★★ (.001) .000 (.000)
Share of water .020 ★★★ (.005) .000 (.001)
Tourism .010 ★★★ (.002) -.001 (.001)
Met.area .049 (.032) .028 ★★★ (.007)
Peripherality -.001★ (.001) -.000 (.000)
Poverty -.004★ (.001) .000 (.000)
East -.456 ★★★ (.075) -.103 ★★★ (.020)
Rural -.058 (.065) .011 (.014)
Rural x East .189★ (.076) -.022 (.018)
Region Controls
Population growth .018 ★★★ (.003) .002 (.001)
log Density .561 ★★★ (.058) -.000 (.010)
Individual Characteristics
German .065 ★★★ (.015)
Married .232 ★★★ (.005)
Female -.073 ★★★ (.005)
Year of birth .050 ★★★ (.007)
Year of birth sqrd -.002★★ (.001)
Education .080 ★★★ (.007)
Education sqrd. -.002 ★★★ (.000)
No. of household members .074 ★★★ (.003)
R2 .898 .334
Results for the land price are obtained from least squares estimation with 435 observations; het-
eroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. The income regression results are obtained
using weighted-least squares with weights for individual sampling probabilities. Sum of weighted
observations: 211190. Robust standard errors clustered at region level in parentheses. ★ denotes
signiﬁcance at the 10% level (★★ at 5%, ★★★ at 1% level).
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Table 1.3: Income Regression: Further Results
log Household Inc. (net) log Household Inc. (net)
complete sample sample of mobile Households
Variable (1) (2)
Region Characteristics
Leisure facilities .103 (.057) .190★★ (.073)
Crime -.054 (.045) -.022 (.053)
Accessibility -.044 (.036) -.060 (.040)
Education .008 (.061) .040 (.069)
Local labor market .201 ★★★ (.038) .160 ★★★ (.046)
Altern. job opport. .090 (.108) .077 (.127)
Sunshine .004 (.003) .006★ (.003)
log Ind. emissions -.001 (.006) .005 (.007)
Share of forest .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Share of water .000 (.001) .000 (.001)
Tourism -.001 (.001) .000 (.001)
Met.area .028 ★★★ (.007) .035 ★★★ (.009)
Peripheral -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000)
Poverty .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
East -.103 ★★★ (.020) -.084 ★★★ (.019)
Rural .011 (.014) .012 (.015)
Rural x East -.022 (.018) -.032 (.019)
Region Controls
Population growth .002 (.001) .002★ (.001)
log Density -.000 (.010) -.009 (.012)
Individual Characteristics
German .065 ★★★ (.015) .067 ★★★ (.015)
Married .232 ★★★ (.005) .236 ★★★ (.006)
Female -.073 ★★★ (.005) -.081 ★★★ (.006)
Year of birth .050 ★★★ (.007) .047 ★★★ (.010)
Year of birth sqrd -.002★★ (.001) -.001 (.001)
Education .080 ★★★ (.007) .078 ★★★ (.009)
Education sqrd. -.002 ★★★ (.000) -.002 ★★★ (.000)
No. of household members .074 ★★★ (.003) .082 ★★★ (.003)
R2 .334 .350
Weighted least squares estimates with weights for individual sampling probabilities. Robust, clustered
standard errors in parentheses. ★ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level (★★ at 5%, ★★★ at 1% level).
Complete sample: sum of weighted observations: 211190. Sample of mobile HH: sum of weighted
observations: 127820.
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for construction, it makes sense to argue that, as it reﬂects location decisions, it may well
be representing decisions where mobility is important. This is diﬀerent with the income
data which simply report the earnings of the current population. Hence, lack of household
mobility might be much more important in the income regressions. The second column of
Table 1.3 reports results obtained using a sub-sample of households that have explicitly
expressed a higher willingness to move in the survey.9 For ease of comparison, the ﬁrst
column repeats the above results. As can easily be seen, most of the amenities still prove
insigniﬁcant. Only leisure facilities and sunshine now exert positive eﬀects on the wage
level. However, also the positive coeﬃcient of the local labor market indicator is conﬁrmed.
1.6 Implicit Prices and Quality of Life Index
As discussed above, in order to obtain the implicit price of an amenity the standard ap-
proach does not only consider the land-price eﬀect but also the income eﬀect of the amenity.
For most amenities, however, the above results conﬁrm only land-price eﬀects. Apart from
the labor market variable, signiﬁcant income eﬀects have only been found for metropolitan
regions, sunshine, and leisure facilities. An attempt to incorporate those income eﬀects,
however, faces problems. To see this, consider, for instance, the sunshine variable. Sun-
shine exerts a positive impact on the land price. Let us ignore for a moment the income
eﬀect of sunshine. Evaluating the point estimate of the semi-elasticity at the mean land-
price we obtain an implicit price of e 2.40 per 100 hours of sunshine per year. However, in
the income regression for the mobile households we obtain a positive income eﬀect. This
suggests that the implicit price of sunshine might be overestimated. To see this assume that
the income eﬀect would amount to the same value, i. e. e 2.40. Then, the land price eﬀect
9More precisely, the sub-sample consists of people who responded positively to the survey question
“Could you basically imagine to move to a region that is located at a distance of more than 100 km from
your current residence?”
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of sunshine would simply reﬂect the income eﬀect, in other words, the direct utility impact
of sunshine would be zero in this case. Evaluating the point estimate of the semi-elasticity
of sunshine in the income regression at the mean income level we ﬁnd that the income
eﬀect of 100 hours of sunshine is e 14.95. As a consequence, if we base the calculation
of the implicit price on the diﬀerence of land-price and income eﬀects, we would assign a
negative price to sunshine: an increase of the hours of sunshine would exert a depressing
eﬀect on utility. Applying the same procedure to leisure facilities would similarly suggest
that better leisure facilities would deteriorate the quality of life. The relative strength of
land-price and income eﬀects depends crucially on the factor by which price eﬀects on land
are translated into monthly housing cost. Therefore, the unconvincing results may just be
a result of a too small translation factor. However, it is also disturbing that the income
regression does not point at any compensating income diﬀerentials. One might speculate
whether this results from speciﬁc institutions in the labor market. Another, more simple
explanation is that the income data available to our study is somewhat ﬂawed as it is
reported net of taxes and including transfers.
Facing those diﬃculties we compute implicit prices solely on basis of the land-price regres-
sion. In terms of equation (1.3) this implies to set
푑푤푗
푑푎푗,푖
= 0. Table 1.4 reports the resulting
implicit prices for the amenities. The values in parentheses give the standard deviations of
the prices obtained in our Monte-Carlo simulation to account for diﬀerences in statistical
signiﬁcance.
The ﬁgures report the price per month. For example, the results suggest that households
are willing to pay around e 2.40 per month to enjoy one hundred additional hours of
sunshine per year. To illustrate the magnitude the last column of Table 1.4 reports the
diﬀerence in the quality of life between the top 10 regions in the respective category and
the mean. Accordingly, compared with a region with average hours of sunshine the quality
of life is higher by about e 5.89 per month. In other words, households would be willing
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to pay about e 5.89 per month in order to enjoy the longer sunshine per year which is
experienced in the ten regions with most hours of sunshine relative to the mean. Thus,
combining implicit prices with the observed variation in amenities this column allows us
to see what is mainly driving the quality of life diﬀerences. Generally, we can see that
on the one hand quality of life diﬀerences are driven by geographical disposition, leisure
facilities, and touristic amenities. On the other hand, the labor market conditions are quite
important.
Another important diﬀerence in the quality of life relates to the situation in the eastern or
western part of the country. However, the dummy for the eastern part of the country may
simply reﬂect the incapability to adequately capture all possible regional amenities.
Table 1.5 summarizes the results for the quality of life index for each of the four groups
of regions. Accordingly, the diﬀerences in the quality of life are most signiﬁcant among
counties in West Germany. The diﬀerences in East Germany are much less pronounced.
Within the group of West German cities (urban counties) the maximal diﬀerence in the
quality of life amounts to e 154 per month.
Table 1.6 in the Appendix reports the quality of life index for each county. The table also
shows the complete ranking of the counties in eastern and western Germany according to
the index. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 report the results graphically. For West Germany Figure
1.2 shows that the southern part of the country exhibits the highest ﬁgures for the quality
of life, whereas the northern regions tend to show much lower ﬁgures. For East Germany
the quality of life diﬀerences are less spatially concentrated. This could possibly reﬂect
the fact that labor market conditions are equally diﬃcult in most regions in the East and,
hence, geographical conditions might dominate.
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Table 1.4: Implicit Prices (monthly ﬁgures in e)
Variable Price (Std.err) Top vs. Average
Leisure facilities 97.9 (18.1) 14.8
Accessibility 41.7 (9.67) 9.28
Education 2.16 (15.3) .325
Crime -52.1 (16.5) 6.93
Local labor market 64.8 (13.2) 24.9
Altern. job opport. 131.4 (35.1) 17.0
Sunshine 2.40 (.782) 5.89
Ind. emissions -.903 (.319) 5.33
Share of forest .347 (.063) 12.1
Share of water 1.27 (.337) 19.6
Tourism .610 (.139) 19.2
Met.Area 3.10 (2.02) 2.01
Peripherality -.074 (.037) 5.16
Poverty -.234 (.091) 5.48
East -28.7 (4.69) 21.4
Rural -3.39 (4.10) .905
Rural x East 11.8 (4.67) 9.52
Table 1.5: Descriptive Statistics on the Quality of Life (monthly ﬁgures in e)
Sub-sample Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Rural counties (West) 170 22.7 120 245
Urban counties (West) 159 24.7 76 230
Rural counties (East) 126 12.5 98 175
Urban counties (East) 124 18.1 90 158
Calculations are based on the implicit prices according to the land-price eﬀects. The list
of amenities considered includes Tourism, Met.area, Peripheral, Rural, East, Rural x East,
Poverty, Share of water, Share of forest, Leisure facilities, Accessibility, Education, Crime,
Industry emissions, Local labor market, Alternative job opportunities, and Sunshine.
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1.7 Summary
In order to derive a comprehensive set of indicators of the quality of life in the German
regions, we adopt a market-based, hedonic, approach where the problem of aggregation
of various dimensions of the quality of life is solved using the revealed willingness to pay.
Following Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), we utilize diﬀerences in land prices and incomes
across regions to infer the marginal willingness to pay for regional attributes including
quantity and quality of public services.
Based on estimates of the cross-sectional capitalization of amenities into land prices and
incomes we follow Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) and generate an index of the
quality of life across German regions. For this study, we utilize a large, almost untapped,
data source, the “Perspektive Deutschland” study 2004/2005, a recent survey among more
than half a million households on a wide range of social and political issues, and combine
this with county-level data from a variety of other sources.
Our results show that, indeed, diﬀerences in amenities and disamenities do capitalize into
land prices, supporting the hedonic approach to land prices. In fact, the land-price regres-
sion allows us to predict about 90% of the observed land-price diﬀerences across German
counties. However, with regard to income we fail to detect eﬀects of most amenities: income
regressions do not point at any compensating income diﬀerentials. This ﬁnding proves to
be robust even when focusing on households with higher mobility. One might speculate
whether this results from speciﬁc institutions in the labor market. Yet, a more simple
explanation is that the income data available to our study fails to detect compensating
wage eﬀects as it reports household income net of taxes and including transfer income.
Given this data limitation, it is left for future research to further discuss the existence of
compensating wage diﬀerentials across regions in Germany.
Chapter 1 – Quality of Life in the Regions: Results for German Counties 23
Relying on land price capitalization we obtain implicit prices for each of the amenities.
Taking into account the observed diﬀerences we ﬁnd that quality of life diﬀerences are
mainly driven by two sets of amenities. The ﬁrst refers to geographical conditions, leisure
facilities, and touristic amenities. The second set relates to local labor market conditions.
Interestingly, the results conﬁrm a strong eﬀect on the quality of life not only for labor
market conditions in general but also for the expectation to ﬁnd an alternative employment
opportunity in the same region.
Finally, we derive a quality of life index for all German counties and cities. Accordingly,
among the regions in West Germany the southern counties, particularly those in the Munich
area, as well as in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg show the highest quality of life. For East Germany
the quality of life diﬀerences are less concentrated spatially.
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Appendix: Datasources and Deﬁnitions
Survey data on urgent problems are taken from the “Perspektive Deutschland” study
2004 and are based on answers to the question “which is the issue to be improved
most urgently in your region?” The original variable takes the value unity if the
aspect in question is considered one of the four most urgent problems in the region.
We calculate the average assessment of each aspect in each county. We recode the
variables, such that our regressors take values between 0 and 1, where a higher value
indicates a better situation or less need for improvement (except for crime, where a
higher value indicates a worse situation). The interpretation of the derived variables
is:
Leisure facilities : local cultural and leisure facilities are considered as satisfactory.
Crime: crime is considered to be one of the four most urgent problems in the region.
Accessibility: local traﬃc system/connection to other regions is considered as sat-
isfactory.
Education: local schooling/education facilities are considered as satisfactory.
Local labor market: local market for labor is considered as satisfactory.
Data on alternative job opportunities is also taken from the “Perspektive Deutsch-
land” study 2004 and is based on answers to the question “in the case of loosing
your job: will you be able to ﬁnd an equally good job in your region within reason-
able time?” The original variable takes the value unity if the answer is yes and zero
otherwise. We calculate the average of all answers within each county.
Household income: net household income net of taxes and including transfers in e per
month, grouped in eleven income classes as follows. Taken from the Perspektive
Deutschland study 2004.
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1 0 e – 500 e
2 500 e – 899 e
3 900 e – 1,299 e
4 1,300 e – 1,499 e
5 1,500 e – 1,999 e
6 2,000 e – 2,599 e
7 2,600 e – 3,199 e
8 3,200 e – 4,499 e
9 4,500 e – 5,499 e
10 5,500 e – 5,999 e
11 more than 6,000 e
Sunshine : average yearly duration of sunshine in 100 Hrs., measured at, at least, one
meteorological oﬃce in each county. For counties with missing information the value
of the closest neighboring county is used. Taken from “Deutscher Wetterdienst”
(2004).
Emissions: aggregate emission of CH4, NOx and SO2 particles of 27 industry branches in
tons per sqkm. Calculations based on average emissions per worker of each industry
branch and regional occupation ﬁgures of the sectors. Data taken from the states’
statistical oﬃces (2004).
Share of forest: forest area as a share of the total surface area in percent. Taken from
the states’ statistical oﬃces (2000).
Share of water: water area as a share of the total surface area in percent. Taken from
the states’ statistical oﬃces (2000).
Tourism: number of overnight stays per inhabitant. Taken from the Federal Statistical
Oﬃce and States’ statistical oﬃces (2003).
Metropolitan area: dummy variable that takes the value unity if a region belongs to a
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metropolitan area according to the classiﬁcation of the “Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen
und Raumordnung”. Taken from the “Perspektive Deutschland” study 2004.
Peripherality: average travel time in minutes to the next three agglomeration centers by
public transport. Source: “Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumordnung.”
Poverty: number of welfare recipients (“Sozialhilfeempfa¨nger”) per 1,000 inhabitants.
Taken from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce and States’ statistical oﬃces (2003).
East: dummy variable that takes the value unity if a region is situated in eastern Germany.
Rural: dummy variable that takes the value unity if a region is a rural county.
Rural x East: dummy variable that takes the value unity if a region is a rural county
situated in eastern Germany.
Population growth: population growth in percent. Taken from the Federal Statistical
Oﬃce and States’ statistical oﬃces (2003).
Density: population density in 100 persons per sqkm. Taken from the states’ statistical
oﬃces (2004).
Land price: three-year average price in e per sqm land sold. Mostly calculated with data
from 2001 – 2003, data on 2004 or two-year averages are used where information is
missing. Taken from the states’ statistical oﬃces.
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Table 1.6: Ranking of Counties and Quality of Life (monthly
ﬁgures in e)
Pos. County/City QOL Pos. County/City QOL
West German counties 119 Freyung-Grafenau 167
1 Starnberg 245 120 Alto¨tting 167
2 Mu¨nchen 239 121 Rhein-Hunsru¨ck 167
3 Miesbach 232 122 Coesfeld 167
4 Bad To¨lz 232 123 Du¨ren 166
5 Freising 229 124 Gifhorn 166
6 Garmisch-P. 225 125 Rottal-Inn 166
7 Fu¨rstenfeldbruck 216 126 Rhein-Lahn 166
8 Ebersberg 216 127 Viersen 166
9 Oberallga¨u 215 128 Dingolﬁng 166
10 Bad Du¨rkheim 213 129 Lahn-Dill 165
11 Landsberg a.L. 212 130 Cochem-Zell 165
12 Hochtaunus 210 131 Trier-Saarburg 165
13 Karlsruhe 209 132 Bayreuth 165
14 Esslingen 208 133 Wesel 165
15 Rems-Murr 207 134 Aachen 164
16 Breisgau 207 135 Uelzen 164
17 Weilheim 207 136 Paderborn 164
18 Bo¨blingen 205 137 Gu¨tersloh 164
19 Erlangen 204 138 Mu¨hldorf a.Inn 164
20 Aschaﬀenburg 203 139 Mayen-Koblenz 164
21 Rastatt 202 140 Main-Tauber 164
22 Erding 202 141 Neckar-Odenw. 163
23 Ludwigsburg 202 142 Limburg-Weilburg 163
24 Rhein-Neckar 202 143 Helmstedt 162
Continued on next page
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Pos. County/City QOL Pos. County/City QOL
25 Dachau 201 144 Lichtenfels 162
26 Rosenheim 201 145 Neunkirchen 162
27 Berchtesgadener L. 200 146 Euskirchen 161
28 Main-Taunus 198 147 Westerwald 161
29 Freudenstadt 197 148 Bad Kreuznach 161
30 Aichach-Friedberg 197 149 Amberg-Sulzbach 161
31 Rheingau-Taunus 196 150 Goslar 161
32 Bodenseekreis 194 151 Kleve 160
33 Nu¨rnberger L. 194 152 Oberbergisch. 160
34 Ostallga¨u 194 153 Hochsauauerland 160
35 Tu¨bingen 194 154 Sigmaringen 160
36 Roth 194 155 Heidenheim 160
37 Tuttlingen 194 156 Segeberg 159
38 Biberach 194 157 Su¨dwestpfalz 159
39 Darmstadt 193 158 Steinfurt 159
40 Calw 193 159 Rendsburg 159
41 Unterallga¨u 193 160 Fulda 158
42 Eichsta¨tt 193 161 Neuwied 158
43 Neu-Ulm 192 162 Cham 157
44 Rhein-Pfalz 191 163 Schaumburg 157
45 Main-Kinzig 191 164 Peine 157
46 Go¨ppingen 190 165 Herford 157
47 Lo¨rrach 190 166 Wolfenbu¨ttel 157
48 Traunstein 189 167 Diepholz 157
49 Konstanz 188 168 Oldenburg 157
50 Emmendingen 188 169 Osnabru¨ck 157
51 Germersheim 188 170 Ma¨rkischer K. 157
Continued on next page
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Pos. County/City QOL Pos. County/City QOL
52 Mainz-Bingen 188 171 Lippe 156
53 Groß-Gerau 187 172 Marburg-Biedenkopf 156
54 Augsburg 187 173 Daun 156
55 Fu¨rth 187 174 Plo¨n 155
56 Oﬀenbach 187 175 Soest 155
57 Alb-Donau 186 176 Odenwald 154
58 Rottweil 186 177 Go¨ttingen 154
59 Pfaﬀenhofen 186 178 Vechta 154
60 Su¨dl. Weinstraße 185 179 Recklinghausen 154
61 Miltenberg 185 180 Hof 153
62 Ortenau 185 181 Schwandorf 153
63 Heilbronn 184 182 Borken 153
64 Neuburg-Sch. 184 183 Ho¨xter 153
65 Enzkreis 184 184 Minden-Lu¨bbecke 153
66 Rhein-Sieg 184 185 Deggendorf 153
67 Hohenlohe 184 186 Soltau 152
68 Wetterau 183 187 Bad Kissingen 152
69 Forchheim 183 188 Waldeck-Frankenberg 152
70 Bamberg 182 189 Verden 152
71 Schwarzwald 182 190 Hildesheim 152
72 Ravensburg 182 191 Bentheim 151
73 Landshut 181 192 Stade 151
74 Regensburg 181 193 Emsland 151
75 Rheinisch-Berg. 181 194 Saarlouis 150
76 Lindau 180 195 Hameln-Pyrmont 150
77 Passau 180 196 Rotenburg 150
78 Main-Spessart 179 197 Schwalm-Eder 150
Continued on next page
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Pos. County/City QOL Pos. County/City QOL
79 Wu¨rzburg 179 198 Unna 149
80 Bergstraße 179 199 Schweinfurt 149
81 Kelheim 178 200 Warendorf 149
82 Ostalbkreis 176 201 Heinsberg 148
83 Kitzingen 176 202 Kassel 148
84 St. Wendel 176 203 Wittmund 148
85 Waldshut 176 204 Ammerland 146
86 Straubing 176 205 Schleswig-Flensburg 146
87 Neuss 175 206 Bitburg-Pru¨m 146
88 Reutlingen 175 207 Friesland 146
89 Olpe 175 208 Werra-Meißner 145
90 Stormarn 174 209 Kulmbach 144
91 Neumarkt i.d.OPf. 174 210 Leer 144
92 Ahrweiler 173 211 Celle 144
93 Bernkastel 173 212 Neustadt a.d.W. 144
94 Ostholstein 173 213 Osterholz 142
95 Weißenburg 172 214 Steinburg 142
96 Nordfriesland 172 215 Hersfeld-Rotenburg 142
97 Regen 172 216 Donnersberg 141
98 Pinneberg 171 217 Dithmarschen 141
99 Donau-Ries 171 218 Haßberge 140
100 Schw. Hall 170 219 Kronach 139
101 Dillingen a.d.D. 170 220 Wunsiedel i.F. 138
102 Hannover 169 221 Tirschenreuth 138
103 Harburg 169 222 Northeim 138
104 Gu¨nzburg 169 223 Altenkirchen 137
105 Ennepe 169 224 Osterode 137
Continued on next page
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Pos. County/City QOL Pos. County/City QOL
106 Ansbach 169 225 Cuxhaven 137
107 Neustadt a.d.A. 168 226 Kusel 136
108 Zollernalbkreis 168 227 Aurich 136
109 Erftkreis 168 228 Cloppenburg 135
110 Mettmann 168 229 Birkenfeld 134
111 Saarpfalz 168 230 Coburg 133
112 Herzogtum Lauenburg 168 231 Wesermarsch 133
113 Kaiserslautern 167 232 Nienburg 132
114 Lu¨neburg 167 233 Rho¨n-Grabfeld 130
115 Gießen 167 234 Vogelsberg 128
116 Alzey-Worms 167 235 Lu¨chow 126
117 Siegen-Wittg. 167 236 Holzminden 120
118 Merzig-Wadern 167
West German cities 46 Worms 158
1 Baden-Baden 230 47 Hamm 158
2 Karlsruhe 217 48 Braunschweig 157
3 Heidelberg 213 49 Mannheim 156
4 Bonn 205 50 Lu¨beck 156
5 Freiburg im Breisgau 198 51 Oﬀenbach 153
6 Darmstadt 198 52 Leverkusen 153
7 Wiesbaden 194 53 Solingen 152
8 Neustadt 191 54 Bottrop 151
9 Landau 190 55 Duisburg 151
10 Rosenheim 188 56 Oldenburg 150
11 Mu¨nster 188 57 Dortmund 150
12 Mu¨nchen 187 58 Frankenthal 150
13 Aschaﬀenburg 184 59 Bamberg 150
Continued on next page
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Pos. County/City QOL Pos. County/City QOL
14 Speyer 184 60 Krefeld 150
15 Kempten 183 61 Kaufbeuren 150
16 Stuttgart 183 62 Nu¨rnberg 148
17 Pforzheim 178 63 Straubing 148
18 Du¨sseldorf 177 64 Ingolstadt 147
19 Ko¨ln 176 65 Regensburg 147
20 Hamburg 176 66 Zweibru¨cken 147
21 Frankfurt a.M. 176 67 Mo¨nchengladbach 146
22 Wu¨rzburg 175 68 Bochum 145
23 Ulm 175 69 Weiden 145
24 Mainz 174 70 Wuppertal 144
25 Landshut 172 71 Kiel, Landeshauptstadt 142
26 Mu¨lheim 170 72 Remscheid 142
27 Fu¨rth 170 73 Flensburg 139
28 Memmingen 170 74 Bremen 138
29 Erlangen 169 75 Delmenhorst 137
30 Kaiserslautern 169 76 Bremerhaven 137
31 Oberhausen 167 77 Gelsenkirchen 134
32 Schwabach 166 78 Herne 134
33 Saarbru¨cken 166 79 Hof 133
34 Passau 165 80 Kassel 131
35 Trier 164 81 Emden 130
36 Koblenz 163 82 Neumu¨nster 128
37 Essen 163 83 Wilhelmshaven 127
38 Wolfsburg 163 84 Salzgitter 126
39 Bielefeld 162 85 Amberg 125
40 Ansbach 162 86 Bayreuth 121
Continued on next page
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Pos. County/City QOL Pos. County/City QOL
41 Augsburg 160 87 Coburg 118
42 Aachen 160 88 Ludwigshafen 114
43 Heilbronn 160 89 Pirmasens 114
44 Hagen 159 90 Schweinfurt 76
45 Osnabru¨ck 159
East German counties 43 Sonneberg 124
1 Ru¨gen 175 44 Bitterfeld 124
2 Potsdam 159 45 Ma¨rkisch-Oderl. 124
3 Wernigerode 150 46 Saalkreis 124
4 Dahme-Spreewald 148 47 Vogtland 124
5 Mu¨ritz 148 48 Oberspreewald 124
6 Sa¨chsische Schweiz 148 49 Ostprignitz 124
7 Bad Doberan 145 50 Anhalt-Zerbst 124
8 Barnim 143 51 N.W.Mecklenburg 124
9 Ostvorpommern 141 52 Spree-Neiße 122
10 Meißen 139 53 Do¨beln 122
11 Oberhavel 139 54 Nordhausen 122
12 Parchim 139 55 Burgenland 121
13 Mecklenburg-Strelitz 138 56 Altenburger L. 121
14 Ohrekreis 138 57 Muldental 121
15 Delitzsch 136 58 Torgau-Oschatz 120
16 Teltow-Fla¨ming 136 59 Scho¨nebeck 120
17 Oder-Spree 135 60 Ludwigslust 119
18 Gotha 135 61 Prignitz 119
19 Leipziger L. 135 62 Hildburghausen 119
20 Havelland 134 63 Mittl. Erzgebirg 119
21 Chemnitzer L. 134 64 Aue-Schwarzenberg 119
Continued on next page
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Pos. County/City QOL Pos. County/City QOL
22 Ilm-Kreis 133 65 Ko¨then 118
23 Uckermark 132 66 Elbe-Elster 118
24 Uecker-Randow 132 67 Weißenfels 117
25 Nordvorpommern 132 68 Annaberg 117
26 Saale-Holzland 132 69 So¨mmerda 117
27 Bo¨rdekreis 131 70 Quedlinburg 117
28 Greiz 130 71 N. Oberlausitz 117
29 Bautzen 130 72 Mansfelder L. 116
30 Riesa 129 73 Merseburg 115
31 Sangerhausen 129 74 Mittweida 115
32 Wartburg 128 75 Saale-Orla 114
33 Saalfeld 128 76 Eichsfeld 112
34 Gu¨strow 128 77 Aschersleben 111
35 Kamenz 127 78 Altmark 110
36 Stollberg 127 79 Bernburg 109
37 Jerichower L. 126 80 Kyﬀha¨user 109
38 Freiberg 126 81 Stendal 108
39 Schmalkalden 125 82 Demmin 107
40 Weimarer L. 125 83 Lo¨bau-Zittau 107
41 Wittenberg 125 84 Unstrut-Hainich 103
42 Weißeritz 124 85 Halberstadt 98
East German cities 14 Leipzig 126
1 Potsdam 158 15 Suhl 126
2 Brandenburg 158 16 Magdeburg 122
3 Frankfurt a.d.O. 156 17 Cottbus 121
4 Weimar 140 18 Chemnitz 116
5 Dresden 138 19 Halle 115
Continued on next page
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Pos. County/City QOL Pos. County/City QOL
6 Schwerin 138 20 Gera 113
7 Jena 136 21 Stralsund 113
8 Rostock 131 22 Plauen 112
9 Berlin 131 23 Greifswald 110
10 Eisenach 131 24 Wismar 99
11 Neubrandenburg 127 25 Hoyerswerda 97
12 Erfurt 127 26 Go¨rlitz 92
13 Dessau 126 27 Zwickau 90
Ranking of counties in Germany, sorted by QOL using implicit prices on land markets
considering Tourism, Met.area, Peripheral, Rural, East, Rural x East, Poverty, Share
of water, Share of forest, Leisure, Accessibility, Education, Crime, Industry emissions,
Local labor market, Alternative job opportunities, and Sunshine.
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Figure 1.2: Quality of Life in West Germany
132 > QOL ≥ 75
138 > QOL ≥ 132
151 > QOL ≥ 138
165 > QOL ≥ 151
183 > QOL ≥ 165
198 > QOL ≥ 183
209 > QOL ≥ 198
250 > QOL ≥ 209
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Figure 1.3: Quality of Life in East Germany
102 > QOL ≥ 90
109 > QOL ≥ 102
117 > QOL ≥ 109
125 > QOL ≥ 117
134 > QOL ≥ 125
142 > QOL ≥ 134
152 > QOL ≥ 142
180 > QOL ≥ 152
Yellow: n.a.
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Abstract
Applying the hedonic approach to land prices, this paper investigates the capitalization
of public services and pure amenities in a cross section of German communities. Possible
spill-over eﬀects from neighboring municipalities are explicitly included in the analysis
and prove to be of considerable importance. Estimates of the impacts of local attributes
on land prices are obtained taking into account the spatial structure among unobserved
variables. The results conﬁrm that diﬀerences in land prices can largely be attributed to
local conditions and policies. This implies a signiﬁcant degree of mobility as well as a
sizeable valuation of local attributes by German households.
2.1 Introduction
How much are people willing to pay to live in a sunny and secure community featuring a
good public transport system, nice recreational facilities, and plenty of shopping opportu-
nities? This question is an interesting one, especially for politics at the community level.
After all, many of the determinants of the local quality of life are, at least to some ex-
tent, publicly produced goods. However, local governments face a trade-oﬀ when it comes
to the provision of public services. On the one hand, these services have to be ﬁnanced
by probably unpopular measures. On the other hand, if public spending ensures a high
quality of life, this may both help to win elections and to attract new citizens, thereby
increasing the tax base. Moreover, in the case of Germany, the attraction of new residents
directly generates revenues via the system of municipal ﬁscal equalization (“kommunaler
Finanzausgleich”).
For quite a long time, economic theory has a method to answer questions of the kind
mentioned above. The hedonic analysis of heterogeneous commodities dates back to the
early works of Waugh (1929), Court (1939), and Griliches (1961, 1971). In the context
of this paper, however, the idea of the hedonic approach is to utilize diﬀerences in land
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prices across communities to infer the marginal willingness to pay for single community
attributes including the quantity and quality of public services. Rosen (1979) and Roback
(1982) were the ﬁrst to apply the hedonic approach in a general equilibrium context,
including the location decisions made by ﬁrms. Since then, the method has been widely
applied and developed in the USA (see Blomquist 2006 for an overview).
Nevertheless, there is hardly any analysis of this kind for German communities. Bu¨ttner
(2003) ﬁnds capitalization eﬀects of a number of amenities and disamenities in a set of
German communities. However, his research mainly focusses on capitalization of the land
tax. Given the large fraction of the public sector’s budget consumed by sub-national
governments in Germany, an evaluation of locally provided public services surely makes
sense. The case of East Germany thereby ﬁts especially well for several reasons. On the
one hand, after the reuniﬁcation of Germany, the eastern part of the land has experienced
a massive and continued outﬂow of people looking for work in West Germany. Many small
and more remote places now face severe problems in maintaining their infrastructure while
the bulk of young and productive people is leaving. Among the 505 municipalities of the
Free State of Saxony, only 23 (including the cities of Dresden and Leipzig) show a positive
population growth for the period from 2000 to 2006. A reliable evaluation of community
characteristics that helps to change this trend and attract new residents should therefore
be vital for most East German municipalities. On the other hand, precisely through the
considerable degree of mobility that has been shown by the citizens of eastern Germany,
it qualiﬁes for hedonic analysis of this kind. After all, household mobility is a crucial
assumption if the capitalization of public services or amenities is to be observed.
In order to investigate the capitalization of public services and amenities into land prices
in German communities, I focus on the 505 municipalities of the Free State of Saxony,
using data from a variety of sources. Due to a lack of reliable data on wages at the
community level, the analysis is constrained to compensatory diﬀerentials on the market
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for real estate and does not consider the full general equilibrium model proposed by Roback
(1982). Given the rather small dimension of communities, the possibility of spill-over eﬀects
of local characteristics must be considered. Residents of neighboring municipalities are
likely to enjoy not only the amenities provided in their home community, but also those in
the surrounding municipalities. The empirical analysis explicitly allows for such spill-over
eﬀects by including spatial lags of the variables capturing public services and amenities.
Moreover, possible spatial dependence in the unobservables is taken into account to ensure
correct statistical inference.
The results show that most public services included in the analysis do signiﬁcantly capi-
talize into land prices, with the quality of public transport systems and the share of land
dedicated to recreational purposes receiving the highest valuation by Saxony’s citizens.
The local crime rate seems to matter for households of higher income only, as a signiﬁ-
cant capitalization eﬀect is found for land prices at sites of high quality exclusively. The
conjecture that local characteristics also aﬀect the land prices in neighboring communities
is conﬁrmed as most spatially lagged indicators prove to be signiﬁcant. Thereby, up to
70% of the variation in the value of land across communities can be explained by the used
set of variables. These ﬁndings imply that household mobility in the state of Saxony is
high enough to create capitalization eﬀects. The hedonic approach is therefore a promising
tool in the evaluation of the local provision of public services and can help communities to
develop well deﬁned strategies to regain some of their lost population.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section brieﬂy illustrates the
theory behind hedonic prices. Section 3 discusses the investigation approach and section 4
describes the data. Section 5 presents the results from the land-price regressions. Section
6 is concerned with the illustration of the resulting hedonic prices. Section 7 provides a
short summary.
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2.2 Theoretical Background
This section provides a short overview of the hedonic analysis of the housing market.
The presentation largely follows that of Sheppard (1999). In contrast to many simple
consumption goods that show relatively little variation in composition as well as in prices,
the good housing is much more heterogenous. Consumers on the housing market can
choose between units diﬀering in age, size, the number of bedrooms, etc. Moreover, since
residences are inextricably linked to their location, regional conditions as well as regional
public services become quasi attributes of a dwelling. Each unit of housing in community 푗,
ℎ푗, can therefore be viewed as a bundle of many characteristics, 푎푖,푗, which are demanded by
consumers but cannot be purchased on their own. Apart from these attributes, consumers
derive utility from the consumption of a composite good, 푥푗, and receive an exogenous
income, 푦. Preferences are thus given by the quasi-concave utility function
푢 = 푢(푥푗, 푎푖,푗). (2.1)
Assuming that mobility between locations is costless, spatial equilibrium requires that
residents’ utility is equated across all regions, leading to the familiar no-arbitrage condition
푢∗ = 푉
⎛⎝푦 −푅︸ ︷︷ ︸
푥푗
, 푎푖,푗
⎞⎠ , (2.2)
where 푉 (.) denotes the usual indirect utility function. 푅(푢, 푦, 푎푖,푗) represents the bid-
rent function that is deﬁned as the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a
unit of housing with attributes 푎푖,푗, given her income and utility level. Let the price of
one unit of housing, 푟푗(푎푖,푗), be a function of the attributes of the respective dwelling.
Then, maximization of (2.1) subject to the budget constraint, 푦 ≥ 푟푗(푎푖,푗) + 푥푗, together
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with implicit diﬀerentiation of (2.2) yields the following equality for the hedonic price of
attribute 푖:
푓푖 =
∂푟푗
∂푎푖,푗
=
∂푅
∂푎푖,푗
. (2.3)
Thus, the hedonic price 푓푖 of any attribute 푎푖 is deﬁned as the marginal contribution of
attribute 푎푖 to the price of one unit of housing. Furthermore, in this simple setting, an
estimate of the hedonic price allows direct inference of the consumers’ marginal willingness
to pay for the respective attribute.
2.3 Empirical Approach
To obtain empirical estimates of the capitalization of local amenities and policies into
land prices, I estimate hedonic land-price regressions. In a ﬁrst step, I regress the natural
logarithm of the community land price on a set of (dis-)amenities and local public services:
ln 푟푗 = 훼0 + 훼1푧푗 + 훼2퐴푗 + 휀푗, (2.4)
where 푧푗 is a vector of characteristics of the market for real estate and 퐴푗 is the set
of (dis-)amenities and public services in community 푗. Note, that there is no a-priori
classiﬁcation of the community characteristics as an amenity or disamenity at this point.
However, when interpreting the results the nature of most of our variables is common sense.
The vector 푧푗 contains a couple of control variables in order to capture variations in the
location rent as suggested by standard models of the urban land market (see DiPasquale
and Wheaton, 1996). This includes population density as the main determinant of the
location rent within metropolitan and urban areas and population growth as an indicator
of the expected change in the location rent. Moreover, indicators of the relative land use
and the distribution of residences within buildings are included here.
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The issue treated in this study is of an intrinsically spatial nature. There are at least two
points to take into account in estimating such relationships. First, communities are rather
small spatial entities such that it is perfectly reasonable to expect spill-over eﬀects of (pos-
sibly publicly produced) amenities between neighboring communities. Publicly provided
parks are a good example of goods that enhance the quality of life of all people within a
certain distance regardless of their residential community. To capture such eﬀects, spatial
lags of most community characteristics are constructed. Formally, 푎−푗 denotes the spatial
lag of variable 푎푗 and is transformed according to
푎−푗 =
∑
푘
푊 [푗, 푘]푎푘, (2.5)
where 푊 is a spatial weighting matrix containing inverse distances1 as weights with:
푊 [푗, 푘] = 0 if distance between 푘 and 푗 > 30km,
푊 [푗, 푘] > 0 if distance between 푘 and 푗 ≤ 30km, and
푊 [푗, 푗] = 0.
In other words, the spatially lagged counterpart of the local crime rate in municipality 푗
contains the inverse-distance-weighted sum of crime rates in all surrounding communities
within a radius of 30 km.2 Note, that by taking the sum of values in the surroundings
explicit emphasis is put on the question of how central a community is located. This form
of aggregation pays attention to the fact that municipalities surrounded by many other,
possibly attractive, communities exhibit a greater quality of life to most people than remote
1Distances are own calculations based on UTM coordinates (zone 33, WGS84 ellipsoid) of the Federal
Bureau of Cartography and Geodesy (“Bundesamt fu¨r Kartographie und Geoda¨sie”).
2Although chosen arbitrarily, the mark of 30 km seems a reasonable guess when thinking of cross-
border eﬀects of community characteristics. However, regressions with varying cut-oﬀ values between 15
and 90 km have been carried out and the results proved very robust against such variations.
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places do. On the contrary, a row standardization would ignore this argument by assigning
more equal weights to each location.
Another important point to be addressed in this spatial context is the likely presence of
dependence in the unobserved variables. The literature on spatial econometrics emphasizes
that inference based on simple OLS estimates might be incorrect if individuals are not
independently distributed over space.3 Therefore, I follow Conley (1999) and estimate a
heteroscedasticity and spatial-dependence consistent covariance matrix of the orthogonality
conditions. Thus, the second set of regressions carried out in this study can be formalized
as:
ln 푟푗 = 훽0 + 훽1푧푗 + 훽2퐴푗 + 훽3퐴−푗 + 휖푗, (2.6)
where 퐴−푗 denotes the vector of spatially lagged (dis-)amenities and 휖푗 are the spatial
dependence robust error terms.
In a next step, the coeﬃcients (훽2, 훽3) are converted into implicit prices for the amenities
and public services. In this case, these implicit prices are just the marginal eﬀects obtained
in the regression analysis and are given in e per sqm at the moment of purchase. This
representation avoids any additional sources of imprecision that might arise through a
translation into monthly budget ﬁgures.
2.4 Data
This study is concerned with the 505 communities of the German federal state of Saxony.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for land prices, amenities, public services and control
variables. Most of the data refers to the year 2006 and is obtained from two sources, the
3See Anselin (2001) for an overview.
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statistical oﬃce of Saxony and the Development Bank of Saxony (SAB). The latter provides
a couple of interesting measures of public services at the community level; for example, the
rate of physicians to patients as an indicator of the provision of health services. Another
measure of health services is given by the dummy variable Hospitals which takes the value
1 if a hospital is located in the community itself or in an adjacent municipality. In order
to capture traﬃc connections as well as remoteness, a weighted average of minutes of
driving time to a number of common destinations such as place of work, school, shopping
centers, train station, and airport is used. The SAB furthermore provides a self constructed
measure of the quality of the public transport system. This ﬁgure basically relates the local
number of daily driven kilometers in the public transport system to population density.4
Moreover, the number of criminal oﬀences against persons per 1,000 inhabitants is used
as an indicator of the level of public security provided by a municipality. The degree of
local provision with basic goods is captured by a variable representing the area occupied
by food retail stores per inhabitant.
Another variable of interest is the local unemployment rate, which indicates the economic
situation in the municipality as well as the individual labor market risk faced by residents.
The ﬁgures are taken from the state’s statistical oﬃce, and from the same source stem
the variables reﬂecting the local structure of land use. Thereby, the percentage of land
dedicated to recreational purposes is included as an amenity to households. The fractions
of community area occupied by buildings or traﬃc, on the other hand capture features of
the local market for real estate. By the same token the number of buildings containing 2,
or 3 or more residences, respectively, are included in the analysis. Possible agglomeration
eﬀects that are not due to the considered characteristics are controlled for by including a
dummy variable for cities with a population greater than 5,000 people and the population
density itself. Furthermore, land prices are likely to be in part driven by expectations on
4The exact formula is: 푃푢푏푙푖푐푇푟푎푛푠푝표푟푡 = 1100
퐴푣푔.푑푎푖푙푦푛푢푚푏푒푟표푓푑푟푖푣푒푛푘푖푙표푚푒푡푒푟푠√
푚푖푛(푠푒푡푡푙푒푚푒푛푡푎푟푒푎/푡표푡푎푙푎푟푒푎;5%)/
√
푖푛ℎ푎푏푖푡푎푛푡푠/푠푒푡푡푙푒푚푒푛푡푎푟푒푎
.
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future developments. Therefore, population growth between 2000 and 2006, as well as the
share of inhabitants older than 65 years enter the regressions as further control variables.
The state of Saxony has frontiers with the Czech Republic and Poland. As both countries
show substantial diﬀerences with respect to the economic and cultural background, the
distance to the Eastern border is included to control for such structural variation within
the Saxon municipalities. Finally, a pure amenity is considered by including ﬁgures on
average precipitation in the communities. This variable captures long term averages from
1960 to 1990 and stems from the Federal Meteorological Oﬃce (“Deutscher Wetterdienst”).
The dependent variable of the main regression is based on an oﬃcial collection of purchas-
ing prices for land.5 The ﬁgures used are average values derived from purchasing prices for
lots of nearly identical features and values. These so called standard ground values (“Bo-
denrichtwerte”) refer to lots typical for the respective region and are reported separately
for residential, commercial, and mixed areas. In order to take into account the fact that
companies and households are both competing for land and to guarantee a maximum of
representativeness, I calculate averages of these three categories using the corresponding
shares of land as weights.6 Moreover, the Development Bank of Saxony (SAB) provides
similar data for purchasing prices for land, distinguishing sites of good, medium, and basic
quality. This data is used to check the results of the main regression with respect to their
robustness. Furthermore, income related patterns in the demand for local characteristics
might be detected by separate analysis of the three categories, as better lots are likely to
be demanded by households with higher income.
The spatial lags of the variables Crime, Public Transport, Commerce, Land recreation, and
Physicians are calculated according to equation (2.5). Note, however, that such a spatial
5These prices are collected and stored by the Gescha¨ftsstelle des Gutachterausschusses following §195
BauGB.
6Alternative regressions with the untransformed data showed that the results presented in this paper
are robust to this transformation.
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transformation does not make sense for all kinds of community characteristics. Take,
for example, the unemployment rate. This indicator is not irreversibly linked to speciﬁc
areas of land, since there exists the possibility of commuting. If a community features a
splendid labor market this fact will not only be reﬂected in the local unemployment rate,
but also in the unemployment rates of all neighboring municipalities. Including a spatial
lag of the above mentioned form is therefore not very promising. In a similar manner, the
precipitation in adjacent communities is most likely to be of minor interest to residents.
In contrast, the variables Hospitals and Peripherality are not transformed because both of
them already include a spatial reference to neighboring communities by deﬁnition.
2.5 Results
Table 2.2 reports the results of the hedonic regressions of land prices on the set of amenities.
For reasons of comparison, the results for regression equation (2.4) which ignores any spatial
issues are reported in Column 1. Columns 2 – 5 report the results of diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of equation (2.6) with spatial dependence robust standard errors and including spatial lags.
The speciﬁcations diﬀer with respect to the dependent variable. The results in column 2
are obtained using the local averages of all land prices. Therefore, this “main regression”
gives the most representative picture and is later used to infer the hedonic prices (see
next section). Columns 3 – 5 provide the respective results for the land prices in good,
medium, and basic quality sites, which are based on fewer observations. First note that the
explanatory power of the regressions in general is considerably high. The main estimation
presented in column 2 is able to explain 66% of the variation in local land values, and for
sites of medium quality this ﬁgure even reaches 70%. As the ﬁgures used as dependent
variables are not directly observed market prices, the high goodness of ﬁt is an important
indicator for the validity of the presented results.
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The diﬀerent speciﬁcations by and large give a consistent picture. The bulk of coeﬃcients
on the explanatory variables prove to be signiﬁcant at standard levels and practically all
of them show the expected signs. Moreover, the results of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations
turn out to be consistent with respect to their signiﬁcance levels and signs. Despite the
varying dependent variables and the diﬀerent number of observations, even diﬀerences in
the absolute values of the coeﬃcients are of minor magnitude.
High shares of recreational area, nearby hospitals and a good system of public transport
all prove to be positively correlated with the local price for land, both when measured
in the community itself or in its surroundings. In contrast, high levels of unemployment
and precipitation are associated with a lower value of land. These eﬀects are of similar
magnitude throughout the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, with the results for unemployment and
the spatial lag of the public transport system being remarkably robust. A good provision of
health services through physicians at the local level is also found to have a positive impact
on land prices. However, the ratio of physicians to patients in the surrounding communities
does not show a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. This might indicate that the local provision of
health services is considered to be suﬃcient, especially since the availability of hospitals is
accounted for separately. No signiﬁcant eﬀect is found for the supply of basic goods, neither
when measured locally nor in the neighbor communities. The remoteness of a community
clearly goes hand in hand with lower prices for land. This result holds throughout all
speciﬁcations, although the amenities of neighboring locations and the respective distances
are explicitly controlled for. The results obtained for the crime rate and its spatial lag show
an interesting variation across the quality levels of sites: The negative coeﬃcient of the
local crime rate is only signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcation referring to good locations. On the
contrary, the crime rate in surrounding municipalities has a highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in
all other speciﬁcations. Given that living space in sites of good quality is predominantly
demanded by high income households, this might indicate that public security matters
systematically more to people with higher income levels. The signiﬁcance of the crime rate
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in the neighborhood might be explained by studies ﬁnding that criminal acts tend to be
committed in adjacent locations providing more proﬁtable opportunities, rather than in
the residential region of the criminal (see, e. g. Katzmann 1981, or Bu¨ttner and Spengler
2008). However, without information on the origin of oﬀenders, this cannot be conﬁrmed.
Note that the results of all speciﬁcations clearly point at the existence of agglomeration
eﬀects. The coeﬃcients on the natural logarithm of the population density, on the indica-
tor for cities over 5,000 inhabitants, and on the share of buildings containing more than
3 residences are all signiﬁcantly positive throughout the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. However,
the variables designed to control for expectations and speculation in the market, i. e. pop-
ulation growth and the share of old people, do not show consistently signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
A further interesting ﬁnding is the robust signiﬁcant eﬀect of the distance to the eastern
border. Apparently, the proximity to the countries of the eastern enlargement of the EU
is valued negatively at Saxony’s market for land.
2.6 Hedonic Prices
The hedonic prices of public services and amenities are obtained according to equation (2.3)
and are based on the results of the main regression shown in column 2 of table 2.2. Table
2.3 reports the resulting hedonic prices for the community characteristics. The ﬁgures in
column 1 report the marginal willingness to pay for one unit of the respective amenity or
public service in e per sqm at the moment of purchase. For example, the results suggest
that households are willing to pay around e 0.96 per sqm to have a one percentage point
smaller unemployment rate in their home community. Since each amenity is measured in
diﬀerent units, this exact form of representing the willingness to pay is not very conve-
nient for getting a feeling of relative magnitudes. Thus, for ease of comparison, column 2
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Table 2.3: Hedonic Prices (in e/sqm)
Variable Price per unit Price per 1 Std. Dev.
Unemployment -.964 -1.72
Share of land: recreation 2.45 2.35
Hospitals 2.72 1.28
Physicians 4.94 1.76
Crime -.105 -.254
Peripherality -.251 -1.79
Public Transport 1.31 2.08
Precipitation -.029 -3.26
Commerce .964 .293
W Share of land recreation 2.13 .653
W Physicians 1.26 .186
W Crime -.964 -.872
W Public Transport .029 .493
W Commerce 2.75 .271
reports the prices in e per sqm for an increase of one standard deviation of the respective
characteristic. Accordingly, a one standard-deviation increase in the unemployment rate
is associated with a decrease in willingness to pay for one sqm of land of about e 1.72.
By combining hedonic prices with the observed variation in amenities, this column gives
an insight into what is mainly driving the diﬀerences in local land prices. Apparently, the
share of recreational land and the quality of the public transport system play the biggest
role in location choices of people, as they are valued at e 2.35 and e 2.08, respectively.
Relatively high valuations are also found for physicians, the unemployment rate and good
traﬃc connections, for which the hedonic prices lie around e 1.75 sqm for a one standard
deviation enhancement. The prices for the crime rate and food retailing are of minor mag-
nitude and are based on insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. Surprisingly, the only “true” amenity in
the analysis, precipitation, is very highly valued by Saxony’s inhabitants and has a price
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of e 3.26 per sqm for a reduction of one standard deviation. However, this high valuation
might be a result of the severe ﬂooding that took place in Saxony in 2002.
A somewhat puzzling ﬁnding is that the price of unemployment is not among the highest
ones in this list. This is clearly at odds with the prevailing view that labor market condi-
tions are the main determinant of inner German migration ﬂows.7 However, one possible
explanation for this might be the overall alarming state of the East German labor market.
Given the fact that huge numbers of East German workers are commuting to the west-
ern part of the land, the local rate of unemployment might not be of major importance,
especially not when compared to the east German neighbors. Moreover, the community
level is likely to be a too small entity of aggregation to measure the willingness to pay for
labor market conditions. Labor markets are usually deﬁned as broader regions, even when
ignoring the possibility to ﬁnd work in West Germany.
Care must be taken when looking at the ﬁgures regarding the spatial lags in Table 2.3.
The numbers in column 1 report the implicit prices calculated for the spatially lagged
variables as described in equation (2.5). In other words, each of these valuations refers
to the weighted sum of the respective characteristic within the neighborhood. Thus, a
reduction of the aggregated and inverse-distance weighted crime rates in the neighboring
communities of 1 crime per 1,000 inhabitants is valued at e 0.96 per sqm. On the contrary,
the prices reported in column 2 are calculated for a one standard-deviation increase of the
respective characteristic in the closest community. The observations of the amenities in the
closest neighbor are, however, still weighted with the inverse distance of this community.
This representation relates the valuations to amenity levels within only one municipality
7This view is, among others, conﬁrmed by a similar study for Germany at the county level by Bu¨ttner
and Ebertz (2008) who ﬁnd that among a range of local characteristics the willingness to pay is highest
for good local labor market conditions. Moreover, the “Perspektive Deutschland” study 2004, a survey
among more than 500,000 German households, also ﬁnds that, along with personal relationships, the labor
market is the main reason for moving in Germany.
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instead of a sum of community characteristics and should facilitate comparisons. Accord-
ingly, the willingness to pay for a decrease of one standard deviation in the crime rate of
the closest neighbor is e 0.87 per sqm. This is the highest valuation among the condi-
tions in neighboring municipalities. High valuations are also associated with the share of
land dedicated to recreational purposes (e 0.65 per sqm) and the public transport system
(e 0.49 per sqm). Note, that all the neighbors’ values are lower than their counterparts,
which is a natural consequence of the lower inﬂuence on the local quality of life, that is
reﬂected in the inverse distance weights.
2.7 Summary
In order to estimate hedonic prices for a number of public services and amenities, I apply the
hedonic approach to land prices in the 505 communities of the Free State of Saxony. Taking
into account spill-over eﬀects from neighboring municipalities as well as issues of spatial
dependence, the capitalization of community attributes into land prices is investigated.
The hedonic regressions of land prices on a set of community characteristics are able to
explain up to 70% of the variation in land prices across the communities of Saxony. Estima-
tion shows that capitalization of most of the investigated amenities and disamenities occurs
in the expected way. The results indicate that the valuation of Saxony’s citizens is highest
for a good public transport system and high percentages of land dedicated to recreational
purposes. Furthermore, the local crime rate seems to matter only at sites of higher quality,
which are expected to be demanded by high-income households. In addition, a signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence of attributes of neighboring communities is found. Accordingly, the public
transport system, recreational land, and the crime rate in the surrounding communities
are found to have the highest hedonic prices among all spatially lagged attributes.
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The results conﬁrm the usefulness of the hedonic approach in the German context. As many
of East Germany’s communities suﬀer extensively from the loss of young and productive
individuals, an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of communities with regard
to the attraction of households might help to recover some of the lost population. More
centrally located, small municipalities could use it to develop strategies to take advantage
of the recent rise in attractiveness of the big cities of Dresden and Leipzig.
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Abstract∗
This paper addresses possible consequences of a minimum wage in a spatial context.
An empirical analysis utilizing German data shows that a signiﬁcant spatial wage structure
exists and that, as a consequence, the share of workers earning wages below a minimum
wage will be particularly high in rural counties even if we control for educational and
occupational diﬀerences. A theoretical analysis discusses the implications for the spatial
structure of the economy and shows that while the wages in the countryside will be aﬀected
positively, wages will decline in the city, where employment and population rise. Workers
in the city will further suﬀer from an increase in housing costs. This supports concerns
that urban poverty might increase as a result of the introduction of a minimum wage.
3.1 Introduction
For the policy maker minimum wages are an attractive policy tool. Minimum wages are
apparently targeted at the heart of the poverty problem, the motivation to ﬁght poverty
earns public respect, and the direct costs involved seem low. In fact, the evidence suggests
that minimum wages do have an impact on the wage distribution raising the earnings of
those that are at the bottom of the wage distribution. Opponents argue that minimum
wages also have important adverse eﬀects on employment. Thus, a controversial debate
about the adverse consequences of minimum wages on employment consumes a lot of space
in an empirical literature that employs sophisticated micro-level datasets and advanced
econometric techniques to show that minimum wages have or have not adverse eﬀects on
employment (e. g. see Card and Krueger 1994, Card and Krueger 2000, Neumark and
Wascher 2000, and Brown 1999).
In this paper we argue that it is generally overlooked that wage increases and adverse
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Thiess Bu¨ttner. It is based on our paper “Spatial Implications
of Minimum Wages,” Jahrbu¨cher fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie und Statistik, 229(2), 2009.
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employment eﬀects resulting from minimum wages are systematically diﬀerent for diﬀerent
groups of workers. This is already indicated by the experience with minimum wages in
Germany. While the minimum wage in the construction sector shows quite limited eﬀects
in the western part of the country it exerts rather strong adverse eﬀects in the eastern
part (e. g., Mo¨ller and Ko¨nig, 2008a). Moreover, given the wage diﬀerential between East
and West, Ragnitz and Thum (2007) show that a federal minimum wage would mainly be
binding in the eastern part of the country.
It is important to note that these asymmetries are built in, however, by the same striking
simplicity of the concept that so much appeals to the policy maker: the minimum wage
simply disregards all sorts of wage structures that may exist, including not only wage
diﬀerences associated with skills, occupation, experience, and sex, but also diﬀerences with
regard to industry, ﬁrm-size, and region. While the ignorance of these diﬀerences seems to
be a necessary consequence of a social policy that is committed to combat poverty, all of
these diﬀerences play a role in the economic consequences of minimum wages and, hence,
are important for the eﬀectiveness of minimum wages in reducing poverty.
An important dimension of the wage structure in this regard is the spatial wage structure
that shows up in higher wages in urban agglomerations as compared to rural areas. This
paper argues that if there is a uniform minimum wage imposed on cities and rural towns
alike, we can expect that the minimum wage is much more restrictive in the countryside but
might be rather ineﬀective for people working in the cities. Hence, the wages of workers
that live in the cities might not beneﬁt much from minimum wages. In fact, using the
German example, we present some empirical evidence below showing that the share of
workers earning wages below a minimum wage would be much higher in rural as compared
to urban areas. While this diﬀerence might be explained by the diﬀerent composition of
the work force, we provide further evidence that the regional diﬀerences in the incidence
of minimum wages are mainly driven by a spatial wage structure that is associated with
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diﬀerences in density even if we control for diﬀerences in education and occupation.
Based on these empirical ﬁndings we explore the consequences of an introduction of a
uniform minimum wage in a stylized theoretical model that derives a spatial wage distri-
bution in a migration equilibrium setting with productivity diﬀerences and housing costs.
The analysis shows that imposing uniform minimum wages exerts distortive eﬀects on the
spatial structure of the economy. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that employment and popu-
lation will rise in the more densely populated regions implying that wages of the working
population in the cities might even fall. Moreover, the city population would also suﬀer
from an increase in housing costs. This asymmetric impact is important since there is a
close association between poverty and urbanization.1 Thus, our ﬁndings support concerns
that urban poverty might increase as a result of the introduction of a uniform minimum
wage.
The paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst part is concerned with spatial diﬀerences in
the extent to which the minimum wage is binding. Section 2 provides some basic empirical
evidence about these spatial diﬀerences in the incidence of minimum wages in Germany.
Section 3 provides some further evidence about the spatial wage structure that gives rise to
these systematic diﬀerences. The second part of the paper provides a theoretical analysis of
the consequences of these spatial diﬀerences in the incidence of minimum wages. Section
4 ﬁrst lays out a stylized theoretical model that shows how a spatial wage distribution
emerges in the migration equilibrium setting with productivity diﬀerences and housing
costs. Subsequently, minimum wages are introduced and we discuss the consequences.
Section 5 provides our conclusions.
1In the German case the poverty rate in the cities is almost twice as large as the poverty rate of rural
counties: in 2004, the poverty rate in core cities has been 5.11% compared with a ﬁgure of rural counties
of 2.89% (Source: German States’ Statistical Oﬃces).
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3.2 Spatial Diﬀerences in the Incidence of Minimum
Wages
There is an ongoing political debate in Germany about the economy-wide introduction of
minimum wages. In 1997 a minimum wage of DM 16 (e 8.18) for West Germany (DM 15.14
(e 7.74) for East Germany) has been introduced in the construction sector (see Ko¨nig and
Mo¨ller 2008b). Current political proposals for the uniform minimum wage by some of the
unions and by the Social-Democratic Party point at levels of e 6.50 or even e 7.50. In
the following, we investigate the spatial patterns of the incidence of an introduction of
corresponding minimum wages for the case of Germany.
We make use of the regional sample of employees (Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe) of the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB), which constitutes a two percent random sample of all
German employees subject to social security contributions and provides ﬁgures on employ-
ment status, wages, and personal characteristics like age, education, and profession of the
sampled individuals (for a detailed description of the data see Drews, 2008). Since the
data refer to the place of work at the county level,2 this dataset is well suited to provide
evidence on the spatial structure of wages in Germany. For our purpose of illustrating
possible spatial consequences of minimum wages we focus only on the latest year available,
2004. Furthermore, we include only full-time employed individuals aged between 16 and
62.3
2For reasons of privacy protection, some counties are aggregated into a region.
3Due to changes in individual employment status, employer, etc., for some of the sampled individuals
several, possibly also simultaneous, spells are reported within one year, with the wage level possibly diﬀering
among diﬀerent spells. In order not to overstate the incidence of a minimum wage in Germany, we include
the highest respective wage reported for each individual worker in our analysis. To check for possible
problems with simultaneous spells we conducted alternative analyses excluding all observations with a
daily wage below e 40 to ensure that the results are not driven by such possibly defective observations.
However, all results are unaﬀected qualitatively, and even quantitatively only minor changes were found.
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the spatial diﬀerences in the minimum wage incidence, i. e. the average
percentage of employees aﬀected by a minimum wage at the level of counties and cities
for West Germany and East Germany, respectively. Note that we include the top-coded
observations when drawing percentiles from the wage distribution. As our data refer to
daily wages but not to hourly wages and no information is provided about hours of work, we
rely on a percentile of the wage distribution for full employed workers rather than directly
applying a minimum wage. More speciﬁcally we rely on the analysis of Ragnitz and Thum
(2007) who found that a minimum wage of e 6.50 (7.50) corresponds to the 8.50 (11.30)
percentile of the wage distribution in West Germany and to the 18.10 (26.00) percentile in
East Germany. Ragnitz and Thum are using microdata from the survey on the salary and
wage structure in the manufacturing and service sectors that have been issued by Federal
Statistical Oﬃce in 2007. While this data refers to 2001 our analysis focuses on 2004.
Since the wage distribution might have changed over time, more recent data might result
in diﬀerent percentiles. However, our focus is not so much on the actual share of workers
with wages below a minimum wage of e 6.50 or e 7.50. Rather we are interested in the
spatial diﬀerences in the minimum wage incidence, regardless of the actual level.
A ﬁrst inspection seems to conﬁrm that some of the cities, like Hamburg, Berlin, Cologne,
or Munich, are visibly less aﬀected by a minimum wage of e 7.50 than their less densely
populated neighbor regions. Further visualization of the spatial dimension of the minimum
wage incidence is provided by Figure 3.2 which shows the average population density and
the average percentage of employees aﬀected by a minimum wage for ﬁve county types.
The classiﬁcation of county types is based on the typology given by the Federal Bureau of
Regional Planning (Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumordnung).4 Clearly, the share of
4We modify the existing classiﬁcation such that counties are classiﬁed according to their own charac-
teristics, ignoring the dimension of the general level of agglomeration of their surrounding area, that is
contained in the original classiﬁcation. More precisely, our county type 1 comprises cities with more than
100,000 inhabitants, county type 2 captures all counties with density above 300 inhabitants per sqkm.
County type 3 refers to all counties with density above 150 but below 300 inhabitants per sqkm. County
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Figure 3.1: Incidence of Minimum Wages
Percentage of employment spells with a wage below e 7.50 in East and West Germany.
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Figure 3.2: Incidence of Minimum Wages by County Type
Percentage of employment spells aﬀected by a minimum wage of e 6.50 (e 7.50) and log of density by
county type.
employees that earn less than the minimum wage is higher, the less densely populated the
respective county is. The highest share is found for rural counties where more than 20%
of employees would be subject to a minimum wage of e 7.50.
The visual impression is further underpinned by means of regression analysis, where we
estimate the relationship between the local minimum wage incidence and the degree of
type 4 refers to all counties with density below 150 inhabitants per sqkm. County type 5 ﬁnally captures
rural counties with density below 100 inhabitants per sqkm.
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agglomeration. More precisely, the regressions take the form
푀푊푗 = 훽0 + 훽1푍푗 + 휀푗,
where 푀푊푗 denotes the percentage of employees aﬀected by the respective minimum wage
at location 푗, and 푍푗 is a vector of attributes reﬂecting the degree of agglomeration of
region 푗.
Summary statistics of all variables employed in this study are reported in Table 3.1. Table
3.2 reports the results. The ﬁrst set of regressions, reported in columns (1) and (2), conﬁrms
a highly signiﬁcant negative relationship between the log of the population density and the
percentage of workers aﬀected by the minimum wage restriction. Doubling density would be
associated with a decrease of the minimum wage incidence by about 1.68 (2.41) percentage
points for the e 6.50 (e 7.50) example. In our second set of regressions (columns (3) and
(4)), we replace the density by dummy variables indicating the respective county type. The
results clearly show that the minimum wage incidence is higher in less densely populated
counties: the rural counties are having the highest coeﬃcient indicating that the share of
workers aﬀected by a minimum wage is higher by about 6.19 (8.93) percentage points in
rural counties as compared to cities.
Columns (5) and (6) provide results that include a dummy variable for counties in East
Germany. It shows a strong positive eﬀect conﬁrming the results by Ragnitz and Thum
(2007). Of course, since there is a clear diﬀerence in terms of population size and density
between regions in East and West this dummy captures some part of the spatial variation in
density. This explains why the inclusion of this dummy is associated with smaller density
eﬀects. However, the qualitative results prove robust. As compared to the cities the share
of employees with wages below the minimum wage is up to 2.7 (3.9) percentage points
higher in rural counties.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Individual Data
Daily wage 327130 83.1 33.7 1 167
Sex (is 1 for male) 353047 .641 .480 0 1
Age 353047 40.3 10.6 16 62
Edu.: No 353047 .131 .338 0 1
Edu.: Elementary school 353047 .687 .464 0 1
Edu.: High school 353047 .011 .103 0 1
Edu.: High school w. prof. training 353047 .053 .224 0 1
Edu.: College degree 353047 .045 .207 0 1
Edu.: University degree 353047 .074 .262 0 1
Prof. status: Simple Laborer 353047 .202 .402 0 1
Prof. status: Skilled 353047 .239 .427 0 1
Prof. status: Foreman 353047 .017 .128 0 1
Prof. status: Employee 353047 .543 .498 0 1
Prof. status: Home worker 353047 .000 .019 0 1
Regional Data
East 435 .257 .438 0 1
Population density 435 502.4 654.1 40.0 4010
MW incidence in %, e 6.50 435 12.1 6.62 4.08 56.1
MW incidence in %, e 7.50 435 16.4 8.61 5.08 61.3
Cty. type 1: Cities 435 .163 .370 0 1
Cty. type 2: Urban 435 .101 .302 0 1
Cty. type 3: Densely 435 .299 .458 0 1
Cty. type 4: Densely, rural 435 .340 .474 0 1
Cty. type 5: Rural 435 .097 .296 0 1
Sources: IAB Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe 2004, federal and regional statistical oﬃces, and own
calculations. All ﬁgures for 2004.
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3.3 The Spatial Wage Structure in Germany
The descriptive evidence provided so far has not touched upon the issue of what is driving
the wage diﬀerences that are behind the spatial diﬀerences in the incidence of minimum
wages. Yet this is important for the economic consequences of minimum wages. If higher
wages are the result of a spatial structure in the wages, such that wages in densely popu-
lated areas are systematically higher, the imposition of the minimum wage might distort
the spatial wage structure with consequences for the spatial allocation of production. If,
however, higher wages in the cities simply arise from diﬀerences in the composition of the
labor force in terms of skill and occupation, the economic consequences might be rather
diﬀerent. Therefore, this section further explores the sources of the observed spatial dif-
ferences in the wages.
As is discussed in the regional and urban economics literature, diﬀerences in productivity
give rise to diﬀerences in the intensity of land use which is most strikingly reﬂected in
population density. As the largest density is generally observed in urban agglomerations,
the discussion about the spatial wage structure is centered around the so-called urban wage
premium, i. e. the notion that wages tend to be higher in densely populated areas, and, in
particular, in the cities. While there is much discussion on the determinants of the urban
wage premium, its existence is conﬁrmed by many empirical studies (e. g., Glaeser and
Mare, 2001, for Germany see Lehmer and Mo¨ller, 2007).
In order to obtain quantitative estimates of the spatial wage structure in Germany, we run
regressions relating the log of individual daily earnings to diﬀerent measures of agglomera-
tion, thereby controlling for individual characteristics. These Mincer-type wage regressions
take the form
ln푤푘,푗 = 훼0 + 훼1푋푘,푗 + 훼2푍푗 + 휀푘,푗,
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where 푤푘,푗 denotes the wage of individual 푘 in location 푗, 푋푘,푗 is a vector of personal
characteristics of this individual, and 푍푗 is a vector of regional attributes reﬂecting the
degree of agglomeration of region 푗.5
While the dataset is quite rich, a problem with the data is that the wage ﬁgures are
top coded at the upper social security threshold. We employ two diﬀerent estimation
strategies to deal with this problem. First, we estimate a tobit model. As is well known,
the basic tobit model relies on rather strong assumptions and suﬀers from inconsistency
under conditions of heteroskedasticity. However, with increasing age the individual wages
might well display a larger variance, since the job experience and the employment record
will be more diﬀerent within groups of older workers. Similarly, workers with higher levels
of education might display a larger variance in wages (e. g., Martinsa and Pereira, 2004).
We, therefore, employ a heteroskedastic tobit-model where we associate diﬀerences in the
conditional variance of wages with the age and education level of the individuals.
In a second approach we focus on the median of wages which is less aﬀected by the top-
coding of the wages. We adopt a two-step procedure to censored quantile regressions
suggested by Chamberlain (1994) and applied to regional data by Bu¨ttner and Fitzenberger
(2001). In a ﬁrst step, we group the data by cells of workers with the same education and
the same age, and where employment takes place in the same district. For each cell the
median wage is determined. In a second step, all uncensored cell medians are regressed on
cell characteristics such as the population density.
Table 3.3 reports the results of diﬀerent speciﬁcations using the Tobit approach to the
5Note that this wage regression is concerned with the cross-section. As the dataset used is a panel
dataset that provides information also about earlier years, one might control for all individual diﬀerences
using panel data techniques. Since we are concerned with a cross-sectional issue, this would require to
focus on workers that have moved between counties of diﬀerent types. An analysis along these lines is,
however, beyond the scope of the current paper.
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mean wage.6 In column (1), we report a very basic regression of the log of daily earnings,
controlling only for gender and age structure. The inclusion of the log of population
density in column (2) yields an increase in the goodness of ﬁt and the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
conﬁrms a positive relationship between wage level and agglomeration. To be precise, we
ﬁnd that doubling population density is associated with a 8.7 percentage increase in wages.
In column (3) we replace the density variable by several dummy variables capturing the
county type of the individual’s working place. The results conﬁrm a spatial structure and
show that the wage in rural counties is lower by about 31.2 percent.
In columns (4) to (7) we include controls for education and occupation. All coeﬃcients on
individual attributes are statistically highly signiﬁcant and show the expected signs, except
for the indicator of high-school graduation that does not seem to provide much information
once it is controlled for high-school graduates with further professional education. Column
(5) includes the log of population density. With all other coeﬃcients remaining remarkably
constant, the density again shows a signiﬁcant positive association with the wage level.
Note, however, that the coeﬃcient obtained after controlling for skill and occupation is
slightly smaller, indicating that a part of the density eﬀect is captured by the composition
of the labor force. In column (6) we again replace the density by dummy variables for the
county type. While the urban counties are statistically not distinguishable from the omitted
category (cities), the other three indicators of county categories are each signiﬁcantly and
inversely associated with the wage level. Note that when ignoring cities, a category that is
based on the administrative status and the population size, the size of coeﬃcients decreases
with the density, conﬁrming a monotonous relationship between density and the level of
earnings. For rural counties we ﬁnd that wages tend to be lower by 23.2 percent.
As reported in column (7), when accounting for structural diﬀerences between eastern and
western Germany by means of a dummy variable we get similar results. While the size of
6For reasons of comparison, we report the equivalent OLS estimates in Table A.1 in the appendix.
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the eﬀects are smaller, the qualitative results prove robust: for rural counties we still ﬁnd
that wages are lower on average by about 10 percent.
Table 3.4 provides results for the median wage among the cells of workers with the same
education, age, and district. We obtain a number of 3,863 uncensored cells with an average
cell size of about 88 observations. At least when considering speciﬁcations that include
controls for skills and occupation (column (4) to (7)) the results with regard to density
and county type are remarkably similar to the above Tobit results. The wage diﬀeren-
tial between cities and rural counties is estimated to be on average 20.5 or 11.8 percent
depending on whether a dummy for the eastern part of Germany is included.
Having shown that not only the absolute wage distribution shows marked spatial diﬀer-
ences but also the conditional wage distribution obtained after controlling for skills and
occupation, let us come back to the question of the spatial incidence of the minimum wage.
The signiﬁcance of the density variable or the county types in a wage regression that in-
cludes controls for education and occupation, indicates that there is a spatial structure
that is not simply driven by composition eﬀects: the same worker tends to earn more if
employed in a more urbanized region. As a consequence, the probability to earn a wage
rate that is below the minimum wage will be signiﬁcantly higher in rural regions. To get
an impression of the empirical magnitudes involved, we can use our estimates to obtain a
statistical analogue to the minimum wage incidence derived in Section 2 above.
Based on the results presented in column (6) of Table 3.3, assuming a log-normal wage
distribution for a simple laborer without completed schooling and with mean age,7 we
obtain an estimate of the probability to earn a wage below a minimum wage of e 6.50 of
34%. According to column (6), the wage diﬀerential between a city and a rural county is
about -.232 percent. Given this substantial rural-urban wage gap, in a rural county the
7The associated standard deviation of the log of the wages is estimated with 휎 = .537.
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probability for the same type of worker to earn a wage below the minimum wage of e 6.50
is estimated to be no less than 51%. Accordingly, the probability to earn a wage below the
minimum wage is larger in a rural county by 17 percentage points for this unskilled type of
worker. However, column (7) which includes a dummy for East Germany obtains a smaller
urban-rural wage gap of about -.100. Doing the same calculation for this speciﬁcation,8
we ﬁnd that the probability to earn a wage below the minimum wage is larger in a rural
county by 7.2 percentage points.
While controlling for composition eﬀects, these estimates point at even stronger diﬀerences
in the minimum wage incidence between urban and rural counties. Thus, the inverse
relationship between urbanization and minimum wage incidence is conﬁrmed.
3.4 Minimum Wages in Spatial Equilibrium
In order to discuss the consequences of minimum wages in the presence of a spatial wage
structure, we start with outlining a theoretical model of the spatial equilibrium without
minimum wages. We, then, introduce a minimum wage into this setting, and, ﬁnally,
discuss the associated welfare implications.
3.4.1 A Basic Model of the Spatial Equilibrium
Consider an economy with푀 regions, 푖 = 1, 2, ..., 푁 . Region 푖 hosts 푛푖 identical households.
Each of these households supplies one unit of (homogenous) labor and, thus, the total
labor supply in region 푖 is equal to the population size 푛푖. All labor is employed by
8The associated standard deviation of the log of the wages is estimated with 휎 = .528.
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local ﬁrms according to a production function 퐹푖(푛푖), with
∂퐹푖
∂푛푖
> 0 and∂
2퐹푖
∂푛2푖
< 0. Note
that the production function is indexed with 푖 in order to allow for possible diﬀerences in
productivity. Denoting the wage rate in region 푖 with 푤푖 optimal employment obeys
퐹푖푛 (푛푖) = 푤푖.
To derive labor supply in spatial equilibrium, let us assume that the representative worker
household in region 푖 enjoys utility from the consumption of a private good in the amount
of 푥푖 and of housing space in the amount of 푞푖:
푢푖 = 푢˜(푥푖, 푞푖).
To keep the analysis simple let us assume that each household consumes a ﬁxed amount
of housing 푞푖 = 1 and we can simplify the utility function
푢푖 = 푢˜(푥푖, 1) = 푢(푥푖).
Each region hosts one city that serves as center of production and is the place of residence
for the mobile population. Let us employ a standard monocentric city model (see Fujita,
1989). Production takes place in the central business district, which is surrounded by
the residential district. Consider a household located at the urban fringe which is in
distance 푏 to the city center. This household has commuting costs of 푘푏 and direct housing
costs corresponding to the opportunity cost of land 휌. Since diﬀerences in the direct
cost of housing within the city would only capture diﬀerences in the commuting costs, we
know that the total cost of housing, i. e. direct housing costs plus commuting costs, is
equal within the city. However, the total cost of housing might vary across cities if the
population size diﬀers. To see this, note that we have the following equilibrium condition
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for the housing market:
푛푖 =
∫ 푏푖
0
푇푖 (훿) 푑훿,
where 푇푖 (훿) captures the available housing space at distance 훿 from the city center. Hence,
the distance from the urban fringe to the city center is an increasing function of the total
population size 푏푖 = 푏 (푛푖) with some positive elasticity.
9 As a consequence, the total cost
of housing in the city is
ℎ푖 ≡ ℎ (푛푖) = 휌+ 푘푏 (푛푖) ,
which is increasing in population size.
Note that a larger population size implies a larger city, and, hence, the higher total housing
costs reﬂect a larger location rent in the city center. As the urban area in the region
increases we can also say that density is increasing with population size.10
Under conditions of household mobility, utility is equalized across locations such that the
level of consumption is the same
푢(푥푖) = 푢(푥).
For simplicity, we abstract from other sources of income and assume that mobile house-
holds only earn income from labor. Thus, we assume that households derive income from
supplying one unit of labor to local production at a competitively determined wage. Since,
however, housing costs may diﬀer between cities, we can derive a labor supply function
indicating the number of people that are willing to work and live in the city at a speciﬁc
wage rate:
푤푖 = 푥+ ℎ (푛푖)
9A positive elasticity is obtained, for instance, in the simple case of a circular city with 푇푖 (훿) = 2휋훿.
In this case the elasticity of 푏푖 with respect to 푛푖 is 0.5.
10Of course, a more elaborate model of the spatial structure would include investment in structures such
that density even increases within the city.
Chapter 3 – Spatial Implications of Minimum Wages 79
Given the properties of the total housing cost function, note that the equilibrium wage
rate is increasing in population size.
Labor market equilibrium in region 푖 is graphically depicted in Figure 3.3. The labor supply
Figure 3.3: Labor Market Equilibrium in Region 푖
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curve shows a positive slope that, as we have seen, results from the increase in the total
housing costs. Note that the position of the labor supply curve depends on the level of
consumption 푥푖. At higher levels of consumption and, thus, at higher levels of utility, the
supply curve shifts upward. The labor demand curve, however, shows the usual negative
slope. At the intersection point labor demand is consistent with the supply decision of
the households and we obtain the equilibrium level of the corresponding wage rate and of
employment which is equivalent to population in our model.
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Suppose that total factor productivity is subject to region-speciﬁc productivity diﬀerences,
and let us introduce a parameter 훾푖 that shifts productivity according to 퐹푖 (푛푖) = 훾푖퐹˜ (푛푖).
If 훾푖 > 훾푗, region 푖 has a higher productivity such that 퐹푖푛 > 퐹푗푛 at the same level of
population. As a consequence, the population in 푖 will be higher (푛푖 > 푛푗). To see why,
note that if population would be the same (푛푗 = 푛푖) also housing costs would be equal.
Hence, private consumption would have to be higher 푥푖 > 푥푗. With more consumption 푥푖
and the same housing costs, however, utility would be higher in 푖 such that the migration
equilibrium is disturbed. Hence, the population size in region 푖 would have to be larger.
The additional labor supply would result in a decline in the marginal productivity of labor
and in higher total cost of housing until utility is equalized across regions. Since housing
costs are increasing with population size, and since wages will compensate cost diﬀerences
between regions, wages will diﬀer in spatial equilibrium 푤푖 > 푤푗.
Thus, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (City Size and Spatial Wage Structure)
In the migration equilibrium where utility is equal across regions, locations with higher
productivity display a larger population size, a larger urban area, and higher wages.
Graphically, as displayed in Figure 3.4 an increase in productivity in region 푖 relative to
region 푗 will result in a diﬀerent labor demand curve that shows higher wages at the same
level of employment. Since in the spatial equilibrium utility and, thus, consumption is
equalized across regions, both regions face the same supply curve. As a consequence, the
high productivity region will be larger in terms of population and display a higher wage
rate than the other.
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Figure 3.4: Regional Productivity Diﬀerences with Labor Mobility
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3.4.2 Introducing a Minimum Wage
Now let us consider an economy with several regions, which diﬀer in productivity. Let us
rank regions by size 푛1 > 푛2 > .... > 푛푀 . Our analysis implies, so far, that the wage rate
will diﬀer in the sense that the region with the higher productivity displays a higher wage
rate such that 푤1 > 푤2 > .... > 푤푀 . Let us introduce a minimum wage 푤 such that the
wage rate of, say, region 푖 is higher, whereas the wage rate in region 푗 = 푖+1 is lower. To see
how this aﬀects the spatial distribution of activities, consider ﬁrst the lower-productivity
region where 푤 > 푤푗. We can see immediately, that for the marginal product of labor to
rise, employment will have to decline. Without mobility we would obtain unemployment.
With mobility, however, labor will move to more productive regions where the minimum
wage is not binding and, hence, employment can be increased. As a consequence, both
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employment and population decline in the low productivity region.
The consequences of the introduction of a uniform minimum wage are illustrated in Figure
3.5. The initial equilibrium is characterized by levels of employment 푛푖 and 푛푗 and in both
Figure 3.5: Spatial Eﬀects of the Minimum Wage
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푢푖 = 푢푗
푢′푖
푢′푗
regions utility is at the same level.
With the introduction of the minimum wage, labor market equilibrium in region 푗 requires
a decline in employment to a level 푛′푗, and with higher wages and smaller housing costs
there is an increase of utility in the low productivity region. The high productivity region
experiences an increase in employment as well as a decline in wages as marginal productivity
declines, and hence, utility decreases. However, migration cannot restore equilibrium since
employment cannot be increased at the minimum wage in the low productivity region.
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Also for the more general case with 푀 regions we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Agglomeration Eﬀect of the Minimum Wage)
Imposing a minimum wage that is binding somewhere within the spatial wage distribution
distorts the locational equilibrium such that the population of densely populated regions rises
whereas the population of sparsely populated regions declines.
Proof: Given labor mobility the consumption level earned by workers in diﬀerent regions
is equalized. Taking account of the labor demand equation this implies
퐹푖푛 (푛푖)− ℎ (푛푖) = 퐹푗푛 (푛푗)− ℎ (푛푗) .
Suppose that region 푗 is less productive such that 푛푗 < 푛푖. Imposing a minimum wage
that is binding in region 푗 but not in region 푖 implies that
푤 = 퐹푗푛
(
푛′푗
)
.
With this constraint the model is overdetermined and, hence, the population size of region
푗 is no longer determined by the above spatial equilibrium. However, in all regions where
the minimum wage is binding, labor productivity is forced to rise implying that labor
demand declines. With the total population size given, employment and population size
in the unconstrained regions will expand.
Further results can be obtained with regard to spatial price diﬀerences. First consider
wages. Intuitively, the spatial wage distribution is compressed. To see this, recall that the
minimum wage is more likely to bind in the low productivity regions that display lower
wages. At the same time, however, the wage level in the more productive regions declines
since employment is increased.
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Proposition 2 (Spatial Wage Distribution Eﬀect of the Minimum Wage)
Imposing a minimum wage that is binding somewhere within the spatial wage distribution
tends to compress the spatial wage structure.
Proof: We know from Proposition 1, that all regions where the minimum wage is not
binding face an employment increase. All regions where the minimum wage is binding
experience a decline in employment. Hence, the marginal productivity is increasing in all
regions where the wage rate is below the minimum wage, whereas it declines in all regions
above the minimum wage. As a consequence, wages in the latter group decline, whereas
wages in the former group increase.
With regard to housing costs a diﬀerent result is obtained. Due to the agglomeration
eﬀect, we have a larger demand for space in the large regions that are unconstrained and
a reduction of the demand for space in the smaller, constrained regions. Let us state this
as our third proposition.
Proposition 3 (Location Rent Eﬀect of the Minimum Wage)
Imposing a minimum wage that is binding somewhere within the spatial wage distribution
tends to raise total housing costs and location rent in the more densely populated regions
and to reduce total housing costs and location rent in the less densely populated regions.
Proof: We know from Proposition 1, that all regions where the minimum wage is not
binding face an increase in population. All regions where the minimum wage is binding,
experience a decline in population. Hence, the total housing costs are increasing in the
ﬁrst group but decreasing in the latter.
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3.4.3 Welfare Implications
It is tempting to consider welfare implications. We have one group of workers that expe-
rience higher wages at lower housing costs. For this group utility rises. A second group of
workers in the high productivity regions experience a utility decline since wages fall and
housing costs rise. A third group of workers that leave region 푗, ...,푀 and move to regions
1, ..., 푖 also experience a decline in utility. In fact, since utility is equalized across regions
in the initial equilibrium, and will still be equalized across regions 1, ..., 푖 where wages are
above the minimum wage, the decline in utility experienced by the second and third groups
of workers will be the same. Can we say that the gain of the one group with an increase
in utility outweigh the losses of the other two groups? In order to address this question
it is useful to discuss the eﬃciency properties of the spatial equilibrium with and without
minimum wages. A standard way to approach this issue is to invoke a central planner that
aims at maximizing the utility of a representative worker household in jurisdiction 푖 under
the spatial equilibrium constraint that worker utility is equalized across jurisdictions.
ℒ푐푝 = 푢 (푥푖) +
푀∑
푗 ∕=푖
휈푗[푢(푥푗)− 푢(푥푖)]
+휇
푀∑
푗=1
[퐹푗 − (푥푗 + ℎ (푛푗))푛푗]
+휑
[
푁 −
푀∑
푗=1
푛푖
]
.
The ﬁrst set of constraints require that worker utility is equalized across regions – they
may be referred to as mobility constraints. The second set of constraints capture the
budget constraints for the households requiring that the sum of a region’s households’
consumption and total housing costs is equal to the total income in this region. The last
constraint simply states that the total population is ﬁxed. The eﬃcient spatial allocation
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of labor is obtained from the ﬁrst order condition with regard to the population size.
∂ℒ푐푝
∂푛푖
= 휇 (퐹푖푛 − 푥푖 − ℎ푖 − ℎ푖푛푛푖)− 휑 = 0.
Taking account of the mobility constraints we derive the locational eﬃciency condition
(Wildasin, 1986)
퐹푖푛 (푛푖)− ℎ (푛푖)− ℎ푛 (푛푖)푛푖 = 퐹푗푛 (푛푗)− ℎ (푛푗)− ℎ푛 (푛푗)푛푗,
implying that a reallocation of labor cannot increase output net of housing costs.
Note that there is a discrepancy between the central planner’s allocation and the above
migration equilibrium even without the imposition of minimum wages. This is caused
by the crowding eﬀect that arises through the impact of population changes on the total
housing costs. Intuitively, when moving from one region to the other the household ignores
the crowding eﬀect. Therefore, the laissez faire migration equilibrium turns out to be not
eﬃcient in our model. However, the imposition of the minimum wage does not improve
this situation.
To see this, consider the crowding eﬀect ℎ푛 (푛푖)푛푖 and note that it is positive and increasing
in 푛푖. Hence, this term tends to be larger in the larger region. Compared with the basic
spatial equilibrium, the marginal productivity in the larger region is too low – in the
smaller region it is too high. Therefore, we know that the eﬃcient allocation of labor and
population would be such that employment and population are smaller in region 푖. Thus,
denoting the eﬃcient population size with a star we get
푛푖 > 푛
★
푖 > 푛
★
푗 > 푛푗.
However, with minimum wages, we know that we have an increase in agglomeration relative
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to the spatial equilibrium distribution, 푛푖 > 푛푖 and 푛푗 < 푛푗. Hence
푛푖 > 푛푖 > 푛
★
푖 > 푛
★
푗 > 푛푗 > 푛푗.
Thus, we can say that if there is an ineﬃcient spatial equilibrium with excessive agglom-
eration, due to crowding eﬀects, the imposition of minimum wages would give a further
push towards excessive agglomeration.
Therefore, there is no possibility for a Pareto improvement, the group of workers that
beneﬁts from minimum wages cannot compensate the others.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed consequences of uniform minimum wages for the spatial
structure of the economy. The starting point is the notion that a minimum wage is much
more restrictive in the countryside but might be rather ineﬀective for people working in
the cities.
An empirical analysis exploiting German data shows that a uniform minimum wage would
aﬀect the regional labor markets quite diﬀerently. In particular, we ﬁnd that the share of
workers that will be directly aﬀected by the minimum wage is higher in rural counties as
compared to cities and urban counties. While this supports concerns that the minimum
wage is more eﬀective in the rural as compared to urban areas, the economic consequences
depend on the nature of the urban-rural wage diﬀerences. A further empirical analysis,
however, shows that the wage diﬀerences are mainly associated with systematic spatial
diﬀerences in the wages. Thus, the diﬀerences in the incidence of the minimum wage are
driven by the spatial wage structure. According to our estimates, and based on some
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simplifying assumptions, for a simple laborer without completed schooling and with mean
age the probability to earn a wage below the minimum wage is larger in a rural county by
17 percentage points as compared to a city or urban county.
To explore the consequences of the spatial diﬀerences in the incidence of minimum wages,
we present a spatial equilibrium model of the labor market, where wage diﬀerences occur
due to productivity diﬀerences and housing costs. Imposing uniform minimum wages in
this setting exerts some distortive eﬀects on the spatial structure of the economy. While
the wages in the countryside will tend to rise, wages would decline in the city, where
employment and population increase. Workers in cities will further suﬀer from an increase
in housing costs. Thus, a federal minimum wage will tend to spur rural-urban migration
and might raise rather than reduce urban poverty.
Having discussed the spatial implications of minimum wages in a rather straightforward
model of the spatial equilibrium, let us brieﬂy talk about possible limitations and exten-
sions. A ﬁrst issue is the possible existence of federal welfare programs. Such programmes
would exert similar eﬀects as minimum wages if they deﬁne a uniform reservation wage.
Whether or not this is the case in Germany is not obvious, however. While the subsidies
according to SGB II are, in fact, uniform, the large housing subsidy programme cate-
gorizes the cities and municipalities and assigns higher subsidies to households in urban
agglomerations.
A second important issue is the role of wage bargaining. In Germany wage bargaining
leads to sector-speciﬁc agreements deﬁning wage ﬂoors that are uniform across several
regions. This kind of agreements may exert similar eﬀects on the spatial wage structure.
However, wage bargaining is much less restrictive as it does not apply to all ﬁrms and shows
some limited regional diﬀerences (Bu¨ttner, 1999). Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that
these agreements might have already contributed to some excess agglomeration eﬀect in
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Germany.
Finally, we should note that the spatial wage structure is only one example of wage struc-
tures that are disregarded by a uniform minimum wage. With other types of systematic
wage diﬀerences such as the ﬁrm-size wage distribution, similar problems will arise. Since
a uniform minimum wage is more binding for smaller ﬁrms, it would distort the ﬁrm-size
distribution, and in a competitive setting would beneﬁt capital owners of larger ﬁrms, in
the same way as the distortion of the spatial wage structure emphasized in this paper
beneﬁts land owners in cities.
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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the household’s decision to reside and work either in
the central metropolitan area, or in the surrounding nonmetropolitan area, or to commute
between the two regions. As economic theory suggests, the location decision amounts to
trading oﬀ wages, housing costs, and commuting time. A mixed logit model is employed
to quantify the interaction eﬀects of these economic factors in the joint residential and job
location choice. The empirical approach does not rely on the restrictive IIA assumption
and allows for arbitrary correlation patterns between coeﬃcients. Using data from a recent
survey of more than half a million German households, the elasticities of individual location
choice with respect to wages, housing costs, and commuting time are estimated. The
results show that individual valuations of these factors are of the expected signs but vary
substantially in the population. Shifts in consumer surplus and in the spatial distribution
of households that are associated with changes in the determinants of location choice are
calculated based on the empirical estimates.
4.1 Introduction
The daily commute is an understood part of the job for the vast majority of people in
the workforce. Strictly speaking, everybody who does not work at home is a commuter.
The individual’s decision on the extent of her daily commute is thereby inextricably linked
to the decisions on where to live and where to work, respectively. Apparently, the non-
separate choices on residence, job location, and the daily commute lead to a huge variety of
outcomes in reality. The extent of commuting we can observe ranges from a three-minutes
walk down the street to a three-hour trip. Commuting trips may take place within the
community of residence or across the borders of communities, counties, federal states,
or even countries. The magnitudes involved with commuting are thereby substantial in
many dimensions. Following the most general deﬁnition of commuting, 85% of German
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employees considered themselves to be commuters in 2004.1 The share of in-commuters
among employees at the community of work was 37% in Germany in 2003.2 Moreover,
about 17% of commuters in Germany travel more than 25 km and ﬁve % more than 50 km
one-way to their place of work.3 The phenomenon is of course not restricted to Germany as
the OECD statistics suggest: “Between one and 16% of the employed in OECD countries
commute between regions every day.”4
The typical picture one bears in mind when thinking about the issue is that people live
in suburbs and commute to an urban center, where all the work is located at the central
business district (CBD). This view of the “monocentric city” has been formally described
and analyzed in the seminal works of Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), and Mills (1972). Al-
though in reality production is of course not exclusively located at the city centers, Figure
4.1 illustrates that the assumption of monocentricity is a fairly good approximation of the
structure of the labor markets constituted by many German cities. The map shows detailed
commuting patterns in Germany. In numerous cases like Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, etc.,
there is a dominant center which attracts employees from a large surrounding area. All
economic models in the Alonso-Muth-Mills tradition share certain basic insights, regardless
of whether the production is located only at the city center or also at other points in space
(“polycentric cities”). The individual location choice in this kind of models is determined
by trade oﬀs between wages, housing costs, and the economic cost of commuting. Besides
these economic factors, the literature emphasizes the role of amenities and the local quality
of life in the household’s location choice.5 Common to all these studies is the economic
view that in equilibrium all the relevant factors balance out, such that utility is equal
1See Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005.
2Figures from the Federal Employment Oﬃce.
3See Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005.
4See OECD, 2005.
5The pioneering works being those of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982); see Blomquist (2006) for recent
developments.
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Figure 4.1: Commuting Patterns in Germany
Source: BBR (2005)
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across locations and/or choices.6 Interestingly, the more recent new-economic-geography
literature by and large ignores the phenomenon of commuting and consequently treats
place of residence and place of production as the same (e. g. Krugman, 1991). There are,
however, exceptions like the works of Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1995), Tabuchi (1998),
Murata and Thisse (2005), Tabuchi and Thisse (2005), and Borck et al. (2007). The just
mentioned strand of literature appropriately emphasizes the role of industry location for
the formation of commuting patterns. I will focus on the determinants of location decisions
of individuals only, who arguably take the locations of possible employers as given.
According to economic theory, local wages, housing costs, and the cost of commuting repre-
sent the three most important economic determinants of the household’s location decisions.
The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive approach to empirically quan-
tify the impacts of all three factors and their interactions in individual location choice.
To theses ends, I exploit an extensive individual-level data set containing information on
individual choices of residence and work location, commuting time, and individual char-
acteristics. Augmenting these ﬁgures with county-level data on wages and housing costs,
I estimate the underlying preferences that govern individual location choices. Discrete
choice models have been widely used to analyze the determinants of the location choice of
households. For example, Quigley (1985) or Nechyba and Strauss (1998) focus on the role
of public services. Recent advances include Schmidheiny (2006) and Bayer et al. (2007),
who are concerned with issues of sorting. Most of this literature looks at the choice of
community, school district, or neighborhood. In contrast, the present analysis follows the
idea of So et al. (2001) to focus on the relationship between the metropolitan area and
its surrounding nonmetropolitan area. In their analysis, the choice set boils down to four
alternatives: (1) To live and work in the CBD, (2) to live and work in the nonmetropolitan
area, (3) to live in the nonmetropolitan area and work in the CBD, or (4) to live in the
6However, Frey and Stutzer (2008) cast serious doubts on this strong notion of equilibrium.
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CBD and work in the nonmetropolitan area, respectively. The object of their study is the
metropolitan area of Des Moines, Iowa, and the surrounding nonmetropolitan area. While
adopting their modeling of the choice set, I apply it to a richer set of data which provides
improved preconditions for the estimation. On the one hand, the data provides the relevant
information on all labor market-regions in Germany instead of only one, allowing me to
focus on the three largest cities, i. e. Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich. On the other hand,
the households’ counties of residence and work are identiﬁed in the data, such that regional
ﬁgures can be assigned to the alternatives that have not been chosen. This means, in par-
ticular, that reliable information on the counterfactual outcomes of individual decisions is
available.
For the purpose of estimation, I employ a mixed logit model where coeﬃcients are allowed
to vary randomly over decision makers, instead of being constant.7 Train et al. (1987) and
Ben-Akiva et al. (1993) are early works applying this method. Improvements in computer
speed have led to an increasing use of such simulation based models of discrete choice, for
instance in Bhat (1998) and Brownstone and Train (1999). This empirical model is par-
ticularly appropriate in the present context as it elegantly sidesteps some issues involved
with classic multinomial logit estimation. Depending on the exact situation to be analyzed,
individual location choice typically is at odds with the restrictive “independence of irrel-
evant alternatives” (IIA) assumption that is implicit in logit models. Most of the above
mentioned studies make use of nested structures to address this problem.8 The mixed logit
model employed here does not rely on the IIA assumption. It further accommodates the
hierarchical structure of location choice, given that three diﬀerent labor market-regions
are at scrutiny. More precisely, households are assumed to ﬁrst choose a labor-market
7This approach is also known as “random coeﬃcients logit” or “error components logit.” See Train
(2003) for an excellent introduction.
8A very illustrative example is Quigley (1985). He considers the household’s location choice in three
stages: Choice of dwelling given the choice of neighborhood and town, choice of neighborhood given choice
of town and ﬁnally the choice of town.
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region. Then, they decide on one of the four combinations of the location of job and
residence in the (non)metropolitan area, given the choice of labor market. This is an anal-
ogous proceeding to the nested models mentioned before. Moreover, I allow for arbitrary
correlation patterns in the estimation of coeﬃcients. This approach explicitly addresses
the problem that utility might be correlated over the four alternatives within each labor
market, given the modeling of the choice set. The estimation results clearly conﬁrm the
predictions of economic theory with respect to the important roles of wages, housing costs,
and commuting costs in the individual location decision. Moreover, the ﬁndings indicate
a considerable degree of variation in the households’ valuation of commuting- and housing
costs. The estimation results are converted to elasticities to show how changes in wages,
housing costs, or commuting time aﬀect the distribution of households between metropoli-
tan and nonmetropolitan areas. Accordingly, no systematic diﬀerences in the magnitude
of the impacts between the three factors are found. Further results include the calculation
of changes in consumer surplus induced by changes in the explanatory variables.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section brieﬂy outlines the
underlying economic theory. In section 4.3 the empirical setting and the data are described
before the econometric speciﬁcation is illustrated in detail. Section 4.4 presents the results
from the mixed logit estimation, the implied elasticities, and results on consumer surplus.
Section 4.5 discusses quantitative implications of the results on the basis of two hypothetical
scenarios. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Theory
In order to brieﬂy illustrate the economic theory that underlies the empirical analysis, this
section develops a simple model of household preferences and location choice.
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4.2.1 Household Preferences
Regions are assumed to consist of a metropolitan area and a surrounding nonmetropolitan
area. The political borders of the central area are the outcome of historical processes and
are therefore considered as given. Each of the two areas 푖 is characterized by a bundle of
local attributes, 퐴푖, and a competitive local housing market where the local price of housing,
푝푖, is determined. In addition, in each area a numeraire good, 푧, is produced with labor
as the only input. Assume that 푧 can be shipped costlessly within (and across) regions.
Thus, each area hosts a local labor market, 푗, where the wage rate, 푤푗, is determined.
The preferences of households are described by a standard utility function
푈(푧, ℎ, 퐴),
where ℎ is the consumption of housing. Households choose a residential location 푖, thus
facing the local attributes 퐴푖 and the local cost of housing, 푝푖. They also choose a job
location 푗, where the prevailing wage 푤푗 is earned. If 푖 ∕= 푗, commuting costs of 푡푖푗 have
to be incurred. Therefore, each household faces a budget constraint:
푝푖ℎ+ 푧 + 푡푖푗 ≤ 푤푗. (4.1)
Utility maximization subject to (4.1) yields the indirect utility function
푈(푧∗, ℎ∗, 퐴∗푖 ) := 푉 (푤푗, 푝푖, 푡푖푗;퐴푖) 푖, 푗 = 푀,푁, (4.2)
where 푀 and 푁 refer to the metropolitan and the nonmetropolitan area, respectively. It
directly follows that
∂푉
∂푤
> 0,
∂푉
∂푝
< 0,
∂푉
∂푡
< 0. (4.3)
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These derivatives are the main determinants of the elasticities of the household’s location
choices that are to be estimated in section 4.4.
Local attributes may have a positive or a negative eﬀect on utility, depending on their
nature as an amenity or disamenity: ∂푉
∂퐴
≶ 0. This model does not include the descriptions
of housing supply, the production side or the equilibrium concept. Such a full general
equilibrium model is not required in the context of this paper as it focuses solely on the
household’s location decision.
4.2.2 Location Choice
Households simultaneously choose a residential and a job location to maximize utility. This
requires that the chosen alternative is at least as good as all other possible alternatives:
푉 (푤푗∗ , 푝푖∗ , 푡푖∗푗∗ ;퐴푖∗) ≥ 푉 (푤푗, 푝푖, 푡푖푗;퐴푖) ∀푖 ∕= 푖∗ 푗 ∕= 푗∗. (4.4)
A close look at condition (4.4) reveals some interesting predictions of the model, as stated
by So et al. (2001):
Prediction 1 Households residing at 푖 and working at 푗 (commuters) demand higher
wages than their non-commuting neighbors living at 푖 and working at 푖.
This follows directly from (4.3) and (4.4) as both types of households face the same housing
cost and amenity endowment, but commuters incur higher commuting costs.
Prediction 2 The wage gap between locations 푖 and 푗 is increasing in commuting costs
푡푖푗.
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This is a straight forward extension of Prediction 1, since higher wages compensate house-
holds for higher commuting costs.
Assume that the price for housing at 푖 = 푀 exceeds that at 푖 = 푁9 and that commuting
costs are the same in both directions, i. e. 푡푖푗 = 푡푗푖. Under this assumption, we have:
Prediction 3 Average wages demanded in the metropolitan area will exceed average wages
demanded in the nonmetropolitan area as long as the utility diﬀerences induced by diﬀerent
local amenity bundles do not oﬀset the monetary utility diﬀerences induced by the cost of
housing.
To see this, consider two households residing at 푖 = 푀 and 푖 = 푁 , respectively. Under
the given assumption and without commuting, the household living at 푀 will demand a
higher wage, 푤푀 for condition (4.4) to hold. For commuters from 푁 to 푀 the wage at 푀
has to be higher than at 푁 , following Prediction 1. By the same prediction, there is only
one group that requires wages in the low housing-price location 푁 to exceed those at 푀 :
Households who commute from 푀 to 푁 . Prediction 3 for average wages follows from this.
4.3 Empirical Approach
This section describes the empirical setup and the data used for the empirical analysis of
the household’s residential and job location choice speciﬁed in section 4.2. The estimated
empirical model is derived in detail in subsection 4.3.2.
9This is most likely the case at the metropolitan area as prices are bid up due to higher population
density.
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4.3.1 Setting and Data
Given the focus on the relation between the metropolitan area and the surrounding non-
metropolitan area, individuals select one of four possible alternatives within their labor-
market region to maximize utility:
푀푀 : Live in the metropolitan area, work in the metropolitan area
푀푁 : Live in the metropolitan area, work in the nonmetropolitan area
푁푁 : Live in the nonmetropolitan area, work in the nonmetropolitan area
푁푀 : Live in the nonmetropolitan area, work in the metropolitan area
It is assumed, that this choice is made given the prior choice of the labor-market region.
The ﬁrst choice is explicitly included in the empirical model, such that a nested structure
with a total of 12 alternatives10 obtains.
Objects of investigation are three labor market-regions (“Raumordnungsregionen”) in Ger-
many, which all exhibit an explicit center – periphery structure. In particular, the study
focuses on the labor markets of the three largest German cities: Berlin, Hamburg, and
Munich.11 As Figure 4.2 illustrates, these regions consist of a central urban county (the
metropolitan area) and various less densely populated surrounding counties that consti-
tute the associated nonmetropolitan area.12 Comparison of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 shows that
10First, the choice between the three labor-market regions, second the choice between the four alterna-
tives 푀푀,푀푁,푁푁,푁푀 within the chosen labor-market region.
11See Appendix A for the exact listing of counties that constitute the respective (non)metropolitan areas.
12As Figure 4.1 shows, there are many more labor market-regions with a similar structure in Germany.
I choose the largest three, because of the high number of observations. Unfortunately, the numerically
demanding estimation procedure does not allow for the inclusion of more labor market-regions. However,
simple multinomial logit estimations including all labor market-regions with a center–periphery structure
yield qualitatively similar results.
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the chosen administrative units correspond very well to the actual labor markets consti-
tuted by the three cities. Individual-level data on commuting time, location of residence
and job, age, education, children, and household income are taken from the “Perspektive
Deutschland” study 2004, a large survey among more than half a million Germans. It
reports opinions and valuations of German residents concerning a variety of aspects of
life in Germany and the German regions, respectively. Representativeness is ensured by
sampling weights drawn from a parallel ﬁeld-survey with more than 10,000 participants.13
Monthly net household income in e is reported net of taxes and including transfers. I focus
on full-time employed individuals only in order to ensure a certain degree of homogeneity
of decision makers and of the driving forces behind their decisions. Since the analysis
scrutinizes wages and commuting behavior, this is a sensible restriction of the sample.
Commuting cost is proxied for by commuting time. However, as individual commuting
time is naturally reported for the chosen alternative only, the respective values for the
other three alternatives are missing. This problem is solved by estimating commuting time
for each of the four alternatives within one labor market region. In addition, this approach
sidesteps any endogeneity issues that might arise because wages, commuting time, and
housing cost are chosen simultaneously in the location decision. Individual commuting
time (in minutes, one way) for each alternative 푎 in each labor-market region 푘 is therefore
predicted by the linear equation:14
푡푛,푎푘 = 휆0 + 휆1푎푔푒푛,푎푘 + 휆2푒푑푢푛,푎푘 + 휆3푠푒푥푛,푎푘 + 휆4푚푎푟푟푖푒푑푛,푎푘 + 휆5푘푖푑푠푛,푎푘 + 푒푛,푎푘 ,
with 푛 indexing households, 푎 = 푀푀푘,푀푁푘, 푁푁푘, 푁푀푘 indexing alternatives, and
푘 = 퐵푒푟푙푖푛,퐻푎푚푏푢푟푔,푀푢푛푖푐ℎ indexing labor market-regions. 푘푖푑푠 is a dummy vari-
13See Fassbender and Kluge (2006) for an overview of the project.
14Least squares estimation and prediction account for the survey weights reﬂecting individual sampling
probabilities.
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Figure 4.2: Labor Market Regions of Berlin, Hamburg, Munich
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able indicating if there are children aged between one and 16 years in the household. 푒푑푢
gives the years of schooling associated with the highest degree achieved. 푎푔푒 is reported
in categories that each subsume ﬁve years of age.
Wages are taken from the regional sample of employees (Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe) of the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB). These data constitute a two percent random
sample of all German employees subject to social security contributions and report indi-
vidual daily wages in e.15 I merge the detailed individual wage information of this data
with the survey data by age, gender, education level, and type of job. Thus, I assign the
average wage of people of the same age, gender, education level, and type of job who chose
the same alternative 푎 in the same labor-market region 푘 to the respective alternatives
faced by the individual.
The third important determinant of the location decision is housing cost. The regional
statistical oﬃces provide data on the average prices for land in 2001 – 2004 in e per
sqm at the county level, which serve as excellent indicators for the local cost of housing.
However, in this context it is important to consider not only the price but also the quantity
of housing space consumed.16 Unfortunately, exact information on the individual demand
for living space is not available. Therefore, I use the reported number of adults and children
in each household along with oﬃcial ﬁgures on average housing demand of one- (two-, three-
or-more-) person households to proxy for the desired housing space of a household.17 A
further straight forward prediction from theory is that the demand for housing varies with
income. Thus, the housing cost of each alternative is divided by the household income
15See Drews (2008) for a detailed description of the data.
16The monocentric city model predicts an inverse relationship between the demand for housing space
and the price for housing.
17The ﬁgures stem from the German Statistical Oﬃce. Accordingly, the average housing space consumed
by a one-person household in Germany in 2004 is 67.5 sqm (93.2 sqm for a two-person household, and
113.4 sqm for three-or-more-person households).
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that is reported in the “Perspektive Deutschland” data. Thus, individual housing cost is
calculated as
푝푛,푎푘 =
퐿푎푘ℎ푛
푦푛
,
where 퐿푎푘 denotes the average land price for alternative 푎 in labor-market region 푘, ℎ푛
denotes the demand for housing of household 푛, and 푦푛 is the reported household income
net of taxes and including transfers. Note, that the household income variable includes
capital income and therefore diﬀers substantially from the wage variable. This way of
constructing the housing cost variable ensures that the empirical analysis measures the
valuation of housing cost of people having roughly the same demand for housing and the
same level of income.
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics of the sample by alternatives 푎 and aggregated over all
three labor markets 푘.18 The facts are as expected. Wages are higher for people working in
metropolitan areas and housing costs in the center widely exceed those in nonmetropolitan
regions, even though the latter are corrected for individual housing demand and income.
Interestingly, the theoretical predictions are conﬁrmed only partly by the descriptive statis-
tics. In line with theory, average wages are higher for those who commute from the suburbs
to the center compared to wages of non-commuters who reside in nonmetropolitan areas.
In addition, wages for commuters to the metropolitan area are slightly higher than those of
residents. However, the average numbers do not show such mark-ups for commuters living
in the metropolitan area over the wages of their non-commuting neighbors. Commuting
time is, of course, much higher for the alternatives that involve commuting. On average,
individuals who chose diﬀerent alternatives do not diﬀer substantially in age. The average
age for each alternative lies in the category of people aged 40 – 44 years. Furthermore,
people who live in the center exhibit a higher amount of years of schooling and are less
18Summary statistics for each single labor-market region are presented in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in
Appendix B.
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Table 4.1: Sample Means by Alternatives 푎푎
푎 = 푎 = 푎 = 푎 =
Variable 푀푀 푀푁 푁푁 푁푀 푀푀,푀푁 푁푁,푁푀
Location speciﬁc
Commuting Time 30.6 37.6 25.3 47.3 31.1 33.1
Housing Cost 14.4 23.8 7.80 6.09 15.1 7.19
Wage 96.1 92.9 85.7 98.4 95.8 90.2
Individual
Age 40-44 40-44 40-44 40-44 40-44 40-44
(Age Category) (6.90) (6.52) (6.65) (6.93) (6.87) (6.75)
Children .211 .186 .306 .315 .209 .309
Education 11.6 11.8 10.8 11.1 11.6 10.9
Observations 20724 1865 8645 5634 22589 14279
Individual ﬁgures weighted by individual sampling probabilities.
푎: Aggregated over all three labor market-regions 푘.
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likely to have children.
4.3.2 Econometric Speciﬁcation
The objective of this paper is to estimate the inﬂuence of wages, housing costs, and com-
muting time on the household’s simultaneous choice of residential and job location. The
theoretical model on location choice outlined above naturally gives rise to estimation based
on a random utility maximization (RUM) model. This sort of discrete choice models has
its foundations in the seminal work of McFadden (1973). More precisely, I adopt the so
called “random coeﬃcients logit” approach where coeﬃcients are allowed to vary over de-
cision makers.19 In this case, a household chooses a combination of residence and working
place among the four alternatives 푎 (푎 = 푀푀푘,푀푁푘, 푁푁푘, 푁푀푘) which each are located
in one of the labor market regions 푘 (푘 = 퐵푒푟푙푖푛,퐻푎푚푏푢푟푔,푀푢푛푖푐ℎ). Note, that this
setting implies a nested approach, where the individual chooses one alternative 푎 after
having decided to work and reside in labor market-region (i. e. nest) 푘. In the following,
I suppress the subscript 푘 for convenience, as each element that varies over 푎 also varies
over 푘. The indirect utility that household 푛 derives from choosing alternative 푎 is
푉˜푛,푎 = 푉푛,푎 + 휀푛,푎, (4.5)
where 푉푛,푎 is the deterministic part of indirect utility, which depends on observable char-
acteristics of households and alternatives, and 휀푛,푎 is an unobserved random term that is
identically and independently drawn from an extreme value type I distribution. Analo-
19This approach is also known as “mixed logit” or “error components logit” and has been applied in many
studies, e. g. Bhat (1998), Brownstone and Train (1999), or Train (1998). For an excellent introduction,
see Train (2003).
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gously to equation (4.4), the household chooses alternative 푎∗ if and only if
푉˜푛,푎∗ ≥ 푉˜푛,푎 ∀푎 ∕= 푎∗. (4.6)
The choice of factors that inﬂuence the deterministic part of indirect utility is guided by
the theoretical model. According to considerations about the distribution of tastes for
these factors in the population, 푉푛,푎 can be written as:
푉푛,푎 = 훼푋푛,푎 + 훽푛푍푛,푎, (4.7)
where the tastes for the factors contained in 푋푛,푎 are assumed to be constant across house-
holds, while those contained in 푍푛,푎 are assumed to vary randomly over households. Note
in this context, that the vector of coeﬃcients 훽 is subscripted with 푛 while 훼 is not.
In the most general form of equation (4.7),
푋푛,푎 = 푎푔푒푛휄
푐표푚 + 푘푖푑푠푛휄
푐표푚 + 푒푑푢푛휄
푐표푚 + 푎푔푒푛휄
푀 + 푘푖푑푠푛휄
푀 + 푒푑푢푛휄
푀 + 푤푛,푎, (4.8)
where 휄푐표푚 is an indicator variable for people who commute (i. e. 푎 = 푀푁,푁푀), and 휄푀
is an indicator of people who live in the central metropolitan area of their respective labor
market-region (i. e. 푎 = 푀푀,푀푁), and
푍푛,푎 = 훿
푎 + 훿푘 + 푝푛,푎 + 푡푛,푎, (4.9)
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where 훿푎 represents a vector of ﬁxed eﬀects for each alternative 푎 = 푀푀,푀푁,푁푁,푁푀 ,
and 훿푘 represents a vector of ﬁxed eﬀects for each labor-market region
푘 = 퐵푒푟푙푖푛,퐻푎푚푏푢푟푔,푀푢푛푖푐ℎ.
The inﬂuence of the determinants of choice contained in 푋푛,푎 is assumed to be constant
across households. The indicator variables 휄푐표푚 and 휄푀 are designed to capture that the
households’ tastes for living in the center or for commuting might systematically vary
with individual characteristics like age, children, or education.20 Furthermore, including
wages in 푋푛,푎 amounts to assuming that individual tastes for wages are identical among
households.21
In contrast, the coeﬃcients of the variables in 푍푛,푎 are assumed to vary randomly over
households. For example, the individual tastes for commuting costs in the population,
expressed by the coeﬃcient 훽푡푛, are assumed to follow a lognormal distribution with param-
eters 휃 to be estimated. This distribution is also called the mixing distribution. Adopting
such a speciﬁcation accounts for two issues. First, the coeﬃcient on commuting time is
expected to be negative in the entire population as it is associated with a cost. Thus,
the negative of commuting time is used in estimation such that its lognormal distribution
ensures that the coeﬃcient is negative for each individual. Second, even as commuting is
generally disliked, there might still be substantial unobserved variation in personal tastes
for commuting, beyond the systematic variation with age, education, and children. Imag-
ine, for example, people who travel to work by public transport: Some might at least
enjoy to spend traveling time reading a book or newspaper, while others explicitly dislike
crowded busses or trains. Similarly, some of the commuters who travel by car might be
more fond of driving as such than others. A similar reasoning holds with respect to housing
20Oﬃcial ﬁgures for Germany suggest that commuting patterns indeed vary substantially with age,
gender, education, and income. See Statistisches Bundesamt (2005) for details.
21Though arbitrary, it seems realistic that the variation in tastes for wages is less pronounced than that
in tastes for commuting time or housing cost.
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costs. In this particular case, including 푝푛,푎 in 푍푛,푎 amounts to assuming that individual
tastes for housing costs vary even for households having the same income and the same
demand for living space.22 Analogously to commuting time, the coeﬃcient on housing cost
is assumed to be lognormally distributed and thus the negative of housing cost is used in
estimation.
As outlined above, the empirical setting exhibits a nested structure as the choice of four
alternatives is analyzed in three diﬀerent labor market-regions. To take account of this
structure, 푍푛,푎 includes indicator variables for each nest (i. e. for each labor market region),
훿푘, which are assumed to have a normal distribution. As the random coeﬃcients on the 훿푘’s
enter only the utility of alternatives within the respective nest 푘, possible correlation within
a labor-market region is captured and no correlation between alternatives of diﬀerent nests
is induced.23
An obvious issue with the adopted setting is that two respective alternatives are always
somehow similar to each other as they share one feature. There are, for example, two al-
ternatives involving commuting (푀푁,푁푀) and two alternatives that imply living in the
metropolitan center (푀푀,푀푁). It is therefore not reasonable to expect tastes for these
alternatives to be independent from each other a priori, an assumption that would hold in
classic multinomial logit models and is known as independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA). For this reason, indicator variables 훿푎 that identify the average taste for each alter-
native within each nest are included in 푍푛,푎, assuming that their coeﬃcients are normally
distributed in the population. The estimation of the parameters of the distributions of
the coeﬃcients 훽푛 thereby explicitly allows for arbitrary correlation patterns between the
22However, one can think of arguments in favor of the hypothesis that tastes for housing costs are
almost identically distributed for people with the same income and demand for space. Therefore, diﬀerent
speciﬁcations are presented, where the housing cost variable enters 푋푛,푎 or 푍푛,푎, respectively.
23This approach is analogous to a nested logit model, which itself is a special case of the mixed logit
model. See Train (2003) for a discussion.
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variables contained in 푍푛,푎. Thus, any unobserved correlation over alternatives is captured
by estimating the parameters of the distribution of the coeﬃcients of the 훿푎’s. Moreover,
this approach also takes care of possible diﬀerences in the variance of unobserved factors
between alternatives, since the variance of tastes for each alternative is explicitly estimated.
The assumption that the error terms 휀푛,푎 are homoscedastic and i. i. d. extreme value there-
fore remains valid.24 Note, however, that the alternative speciﬁc constants also capture the
average tastes for local characteristics of the alternatives, that have been labeled amenities
in the theoretical model of the previous section.
To be precise, let 훽훿 be the vector of coeﬃcients on all 훿푎 and 훿푘, and let 훽푐 be the vector
of coeﬃcients on commuting time and housing costs. Then, I assume that 훽훿 ∼ 푁(푏훿,Ω)
and that 푙푛(훽푐) ∼ 푁(푏푐,Ω) for general Ω. Hence, the exact parameters to be estimated are
the means of the (natural logarithms of) coeﬃcients 푏훿 (푏푐), along with a lower triangular
Choleski factor 퐿 of Ω, such that 퐿퐿′ = Ω.
4.4 Results
This section reports the estimation results of several speciﬁcations of estimation equation
(4.5), given equations (4.7), (4.8), and (4.9).25
24See Train (2003) for a discussion.
25All estimations, simulations and calculations are carried out using the mixlogit Stata command by
Hole (2007), and my own Stata/Mata code. The code may be obtained from the author on request.
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4.4.1 Estimation
The results of the mixed logit model are reported in Table 4.2. The coeﬃcients on the
alternative speciﬁc constants within each nest, 훿푎, as well as those on the labor-market
region speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, 훿푘, are estimated together with their standard deviations in all
speciﬁcations. It is assumed that they are correlated and follow a normal distribution with
the reported means and standard deviations. In the speciﬁcations reported in columns 1
and 2 of Table 4.2 only the coeﬃcient on commuting time is allowed to vary over decision
makers, while wages and housing cost are modeled to be valued identically in the popu-
lation. The estimations reported in columns 3 and 4 treat housing costs as an additional
random coeﬃcient. Furthermore, the speciﬁcation reported in column 2 (column 4) is
identical to that of column 1 (column 3) but includes some basic individual characteristics
as ﬁxed coeﬃcients. The results and simulations reported in the following sections are all
based on the estimation presented in column 3.
In general, the empirical model clearly conﬁrms the predictions from economic theory as
all coeﬃcients show the expected signs and are precisely estimated. Higher wages attract
people, while higher commuting time and higher housing costs make an alternative less
likely to be chosen. Furthermore, the maximum simulated likelihood estimation procedure
yields very robust results, as the coeﬃcients on these variables are quantitatively compa-
rable across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The estimated standard deviations of the random
parameters are highly signiﬁcant in all cases, indicating that tastes for commuting time
and housing costs indeed do vary in the population. Note, that this variation may be due
to unobservable characteristics as well as to observable ones, which are not included in
the model. However, the estimated standard deviations remain signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero after inclusion of some basic personal characteristics (columns 2 and 4). Thus, I ﬁnd
signiﬁcant variation in tastes for commuting time and housing costs even for similar types
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Table 4.3: Lognormal Distributed Coeﬃcients
1 2 3 4
Commuting Time (mean of coeﬃcient) .054 .009 .060 .040
Commuting Time (SD of coeﬃcient) .079 .064 .240 .409
Housing Cost (mean of coeﬃcient) .103 .122
Housing Cost (SD of coeﬃcient) .284 .397
Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 directly refer to columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Table
4.2.
of households.26 The parameters on commuting time and housing cost reported in Table
4.2 are the means and standard deviations of 푙푛(훽). The associated means and standard
deviations of 훽 are given in Table 4.3.27 The standard deviations of the coeﬃcients on com-
muting time and housing cost are relatively high compared to the coeﬃcients themselves.
Apparently, the degree of variation in tastes in the population is of considerable magnitude.
This result is not really surprising as the individual cost per minute of commuting time is
very likely to diﬀer greatly, with observable characteristics like age or income, as well as
with unobservable tastes for circumstances involved with commuting (e. g. driving a car
or using means of public transport). One can easily think of similar arguments regarding
the taste variation for housing costs.
In the main speciﬁcation reported in column 3 of Table 4.2, the estimated means and
standard deviations of the coeﬃcients on the ﬁxed eﬀects for alternatives are all signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. According to the estimates, there is substantial variation in tastes for
26Remember that the housing cost variable already explicitly captures the housing cost for households
of equal size and income.
27The mean of 훽 is calculated as 푒푥푝(푏+(푠2/2)), its standard deviation is calculated as 푒푥푝(푏+(푠2/2))∗√
푒푥푝(푠2)− 1, where 푏 and 푠 represent the estimated mean and standard deviation of the distribution of
푙푛(훽).
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combinations of working place and place of residence. In particular, the distribution of
the valuation of the “typical” commuting option to live in the nonmetropolitan area and
work in the central city seems to be very dispersed. Its mean is even negative, which
means that, on average, this alternative is disliked compared to the option to commute
from the center to the nonmetropolitan area. More precisely, the estimated distribution
of the coeﬃcient implies that roughly 62% of households prefer the omitted alternative,
while the other 38% prefer to commute from the suburbs to the center. This seems a
little surprising but might be due to lower commuting time per distance in the direction
from the center to the suburbs. In contrast, both non-commuting alternatives are on
average preferred to the omitted alternative. The distributions of these coeﬃcients imply
that only around 9% (22%) of households place a negative value on the alternative to
live and work in the metropolitan area (in the nonmetropolitan area) when compared to
the alternative to commute from the center to the suburbs. With respect to the primary
choice of labor-market region, both Berlin and Munich seem to be preferred to Hamburg
on average. However, the distributions of these coeﬃcients show considerable dispersion,
too, with roughly one third of the population preferring Hamburg to both of the cities.
All reported standard deviations are calculated on the basis of the estimated Choleski
factors 퐿. The elements of the corresponding variance-covariance matrix Ω are almost all
estimated signiﬁcantly at at least the 5% level, indicating that there does exist sizeable
correlation between the coeﬃcients.28 The implied correlation pattern is reported in Table
4.4. The correlation between 푎 = 푀푀 , 푎 = 푁푁 , and 푎 = 푁푀 is positive implying that
households preferring the option to live and work in the center to the option of commuting
from the center to the suburbs would also favor the two other alternatives. The correlation
between housing cost and commuting time is positive and fairly large. Households with
28In fact, only the covariance of 훿푎=푀푀 and housing cost and the covariance of 훿푎=푁푀 and 훿푎=푁푁
are insigniﬁcant. While the former result is not of much interest, the latter is surprising. It implies that
there is no signiﬁcant correlation between tastes for the two alternatives that both involve residing in the
nonmetropolitan area.
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Table 4.4: Correlation Matrix
MM NN NM B M Com Hous
MM 1
NN .529 1
NM .420 -.164 1
BERLIN -.083 -.682 -.182 1
MUNICH -.376 -.830 -.187 .898 1
Commuting Time .099 -.626 .339 .663 .761 1
Housing Cost -.059 -.639 .303 .535 .741 .966 1
Calculations based on estimates reported in column 3 of Table 4.2. Figures in
italics are statistically not signiﬁcant.
above average valuation of housing cost obviously also place higher than average values
on commuting time. This is interesting as the high degree of correlation indicates that
both types of cost are valued together compared to the other variables. Furthermore, the
coeﬃcients on the labor market ﬁxed eﬀects are strongly correlated. Again, this positive
correlation is not surprising as these variables form a group relative to the other covariates.
The speciﬁcations reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.2 further include individual
characteristics as ﬁxed coeﬃcients. The estimates on the personal characteristics provide
further interesting insights. Accordingly, older people are less likely to live in the metropoli-
tan area, but are more likely to commute, while people with higher education clearly prefer
city centers and tend to commute less. Households with children apparently have a higher
probability to commute and to live in nonmetropolitan areas, even if the higher demand
for living space is taken into account via the housing cost variable.
The quantitative implications of the model are based on the predictions it delivers. Given
the characteristics of each alternative, the predicted individual probability of choosing
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alternative 푎푘 is
푃푛,푎푘(휃ˆ) =
∫
푒푥푝(푉푛,푎푘)∑
푗 푒푥푝(푉푛,푗)
푓(훽∣휃ˆ)푑(훽). (4.10)
Table 4.5 reports the observed (column 1) and the predicted number of households (column
2) choosing each of the twelve alternatives. The ﬁgures in column 2 represent the sums of
the predicted individual probabilities of picking a particular alternative 푎푘:
∑
푛
푃푛,푎푘(휃ˆ). (4.11)
The predictive power of the model is quite good as the predicted choice pattern very closely
resembles the observed pattern. The appropriateness of the econometric model is further
conﬁrmed by very exact predictions of the distribution of individual commuting times,
wages, and housing costs. This fact is further exploited in section 4.5, where the eﬀects of
policy measures are simulated.
4.4.2 Elasticities
The coeﬃcients of the mixed logit model have no direct interpretation, so I calculate the
corresponding comparative static elasticities. These ﬁgures measure the ceteris paribus
impact of an alternative speciﬁc variable on the choice of this (or another) alternative.
The resulting elasticities of changes in wages, housing costs, and commuting time within
each labor market region are reported in Appendix B. As the focus of this analysis is not on
the choice of the labor market region, only the elasticities of changes within one respective
labor market region are reported.29 Note, that in the employed mixed logit model the
29Nevertheless, the reported elasticities are calculated allowing each household to choose from all twelve
alternatives. The full set of all comparative static elasticities for changes in one exogenous variable would
give a matrix with 12× 12 = 144 elements. Thus, the reported Tables in the appendix represent the 4× 4
matrices on the “diagonal” of the corresponding full set-matrices.
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percentage change in the probability for one alternative given a percentage change in one
characteristic of this alternative (or any other alternative) depends on the characteristics
of all alternatives. Thus, elasticities are not symmetric as in simple logit models. To
give an example of how to read Table A.4, consider a one percent increase in commuting
time for a household that resides and works in the metropolitan area of Hamburg. This
lowers the probability of this alternative to be chosen by 0.321%. At the same time,
the probability that the household chooses to live in the central city of Hamburg and to
commute to the suburbs increases by 0.022%. Analogously, the probability to live and work
in the suburbs increases by 0.059%, and the incentive to commute from the suburbs to the
center increases by 0.044% due to the rise in commuting time in alternative 푎 = 푀푀 . In
contrast, a one percent increase in the commuting time for alternative 푎 = 푀푁 (푎 = 푁푁 ,
푎 = 푁푀) increases the probability that a household chooses to reside and work in the
metropolitan area of Hamburg by 0.002% (0.017%, 0.025%). Note, that the elasticities for
commuting time are highest in Berlin, where both the city center and the nonmetropolitan
area are more spread out than in the other two regions. In general, households residing
in the nonmetropolitan areas are much more sensitive to changes in commuting time than
their counterparts in the centers, since they already face longer commutes. The wage
elasticities are relatively similar across labor market-regions. Apparently, wage increases for
households that commute from the center to the periphery have the strongest impact. The
elasticities with respect to housing cost are relatively low compared to those of commuting
time and wages, with the exception of Munich. In particular, households residing in the
central area of Munich react remarkably sensitive to changes in housing cost. This is most
probably due to the very high level of the cost of housing in the Bavarian capital.
These comparative static elasticities are valid if one thinks of individual households. How-
ever, by construction, an increase in wages for alternative 푎 = 푀푀 implies an increase
in wages for alternative 푎 = 푁푀 , too. Therefore, more general patterns of the eﬀects of
changes in the exogenous variables are reported in section 4.5.
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4.4.3 Consumer Surplus
Not only policy makers might be interested in how people value the eﬀects of particular
policy measures. A result readily oﬀered by this kind of analysis is the estimated willingness
to pay for changes in wages, commuting time, and housing cost. Given the coeﬃcients 훽
from column 3 of Table 4.2, the compensating variation for each individual household that
is associated with a change in attributes of the alternatives is calculated following Train
(1998) and Cherchi and Polak (2005):
퐶푉푛 =
∫
1
훽푤
(
푙푛
(∑
푎푘
푒푥푝(푉 푝푟푒푛,푎푘)
)
− 푙푛
(∑
푎푘
푒푥푝(푉 푝표푠푡푛,푎푘 )
))
푓(훽∣휃푝푟푒)푑(훽), (4.12)
where the coeﬃcient on wages, 훽푤, represents the marginal utility of income30, and 푝푟푒
(푝표푠푡) refers to the situation before (after) the change.
Accordingly, the average compensating variation in the population associated with a 10%
increase in commuting time (housing cost, wages) amounts to e 37.06 (e 14.34, e 10.97).31
In other words, an amount of e 37.06 in terms of daily wage is necessary to compensate
households for the extended daily one-way commute. This is more than double the will-
ingness to pay to avoid a deterioration of housing cost relative to income of the same
magnitude. Further case speciﬁc results on consumer surplus are reported in the following
section, where the overall eﬀects of particular policy measures are discussed.
30This speciﬁcation suggests that the marginal utility of income is independent from income. Train
(2003) points out that this assumption is innocuous if the changes in consumer surplus are small relative
to income, which is arguably the case in the analysis at hand.
31The integral is solved by simulation using 100 Halton draws.
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4.5 Quantitative Implications
The estimated model allows to carry out counterfactual simulations of the eﬀects of policy
measures that aﬀect the analyzed variables. Two showcase scenarios are assessed on the
basis of the model reported in column 3 of Table 4.2.
Scenario 1 (“Pendlerpauschale”) An existing tax deductible for long distance-commuters
is cut by German authorities, leading to a decrease in wages of commuters between metropoli-
tan and nonmetropolitan areas of 10%.
This scenario is designed to resemble the planned cut in the so called “Pendlerpauschale”
in Germany, which came into eﬀect in 2007 and has been rescinded after being halted by
the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in the end of 2008.
This “Entfernungspauschale” is an income tax-deductible of e 0.30 per kilometer of (daily)
commuting distance. Its roots date back as far as 1920. The described cut planned to grant
the deductible only for commuting distances exceeding 20 kilometers instead of the entire
distance. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.5 show the eﬀects of this political measure on the
spatial distribution of households in the three analyzed labor market-regions. Column 3
reports the predicted number of households that choose each option after the cut of the
subsidy, calculated according to equation (4.11). The implied percentage change compared
to the situation before the policy measure (as shown in column 2) is reported in column 4.
Little surprisingly, the wage drop for the “commuting alternatives” leads to a decrease in
households that choose these alternatives in each of the regions of Hamburg, Berlin, and
Munich. In contrast, in each region the population that works and lives either in the center
or in the suburbs rises after the subsidy cut. The alternative that experiences the largest
relative drop in attractiveness is the option to commute from the center of Hamburg to
its suburbs, where the number of choices decreases by 4.06%. The alternative that gains
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Table 4.5: Model Predictions I: Number of Households
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Observed Predicted Predicted Change Predicted Change
Hamburg: MM 5460 5577 5606 .511 5576 -.019
MN 349 376 360 -4.06 376 -.028
NN 1988 1955 1967 .643 1954 -.023
NM 1922 1912 1885 -1.42 1912 -.008
Berlin: MM 10848 10450 10495 .426 10450 .001
MN 580 559 542 -3.00 560 .182
NN 3003 2640 2655 .552 2644 .157
NM 1685 1649 1629 -1.20 1649 .008
Munich: MM 4416 4922 4947 .515 4921 -.029
MN 936 1049 1007 -3.96 1049 -.042
NN 3654 3747 3778 .833 3746 -.040
NM 2027 2031 1995 -1.79 2031 -.013
Calculations based on estimates reported in column 3 of Table 4.2. Individual choice probabil-
ities are simulated using 100 Halton draws.
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most appeal to households is to live and work in the nonmetropolitan area of Munich,
with an increase of 0.83%. Note, however, that the subsidy also leads to changes in the
choice of labor-market region. While Hamburg looses one inhabitant, 22 households choose
alternatives in Berlin instead of Munich as a consequence of the subsidy cut. The reason for
this pattern is that average wages and relative housing costs in Munich are above the sample
average, while the housing cost in Berlin is far below average. Given this constellation,
the uniform percentage decrease in wages of commuters draws households from the high
cost alternatives in Munich to the low cost region of Berlin. Although interesting, the
choice of the labor-market region itself is not the focus of this paper. Therefore, Table
4.6 reports the average predicted eﬀects of scenarios 1 and 2 for the four intra-regional
alternatives (푎 = 푀푀,푀푁,푁푁,푁푀) only. The ﬁgures in Table 4.6 are the sums of the
individual choice probabilities for the respective alternatives 푎, averaged over the three
labor market-regions 푘:
1
퐾
퐼∑
푘
푁∑
푛
푃 푛,푎푘(휃ˆ),
where the individual choice probabilities are now calculated under the implicit assumption
that the choice of the labor-market region is irreversible:
푃 푛,푎푘(휃ˆ) =
∫
푒푥푝(푉푛,푎푘)∑
푗 푒푥푝(푉푛,푗푘)
푓(훽∣휃ˆ)푑(훽).
As can be seen from Table 4.6, the average eﬀects of the subsidy cut on the choice of the
alternatives within regions does not diﬀer much from that seen in Table 4.5. A look at
the aggregated eﬀects is a little more revealing, though. The political measure leads to a
predicted increase in the population of metropolitan areas of 0.09%, while the population
of nonmetropolitan areas drops by 0.14%. The total number of households that commute
between centers and suburbs drops sharply by almost 2% in response to the subsidy cut.
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Table 4.6: Model Predictions II: Number of Households
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Observed Predicted Predicted Change Predicted Change
MM 20724 20432 20526 .464 20429 -.012
MN 1865 2119 2044 -3.53 2119 .017
NN 8645 8562 8623 .706 8565 .026
NM 5634 5755 5675 -1.40 5755 -.004
M 22589 22550 22570 .089 22548 -.009
N 14279 14318 14298 -.140 14320 .014
COM 7499 7874 7719 -1.97 7874 .002
Calculations based on estimates reported in column 3 of Table 4.2. Individual
choice probabilities are simulated using 100 Halton draws.
The present model allows to estimate the willingness to pay for the subsidy cut in scenario
1. The individual household’s compensating variation associated with the political measure
is simulated according to equation (4.12), where 100 Halton draws are used to simulate
the integral. The resulting average change in consumer surplus that is associated with the
cut-back of the subsidy to commuters amounts to e 2.28.
Scenario 2 (Minimum Wage) The German government introduces a uniform minimum
wage of e 7.50.
Scenario 2 simulates the location choices of households if all wages below a threshold of
e 7.50 were lifted onto this level. In the presence of a wage premium in agglomerations,
which is clearly indicated by the summary statistics of the present analysis,32 this should
32See Lehmer and Mo¨ller (2007) and Bu¨ttner and Ebertz (2009) for quantitative evidence on the so
called urban wage premium in Germany.
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lead to a stronger relative increase in average wages in the nonmetropolitan areas. Bu¨ttner
and Ebertz (2009) point out that under decreasing marginal returns to labor in regional
production, a uniform minimum wage leads to a shift of population from rural to agglom-
erated regions. However, the present simulations can only focus on household decisions
and do not account for the production side. Thus, the outcome will be diﬀerent in that
we expect the choice probabilities of alternatives that gain most through the introduction
of the minimum wage to rise. The ﬁgures in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4.5 conﬁrm this
expectation, although the quantitative eﬀects are fairly small. If households were free to
choose from all options, the minimum wage of e 7.50 would draw decision makers from
virtually all alternatives in Hamburg and Munich to all of the options in the region of
Berlin. Especially the alternatives that involve working in the periphery of Berlin expe-
rience a strong rise in choice probability, with 0.18% for commuting from the center and
0.16% for living and working in the nonmetropolitan area. This is because wages in the
East-German periphery of Berlin are well below the sample average and the percentage of
incomes below the minimum wage of e 7.50 is by far highest there. In contrast, the largest
population losses are induced for the alternatives to commute to the nonmetropolitan area
of Munich, and to live and work in that area, respectively. This is exactly the peripheral
region in the sample that exhibits the highest wages and the lowest incidence of the mini-
mum wage. In total, the model predicts a population gain of 6 households for Berlin and
losses of 2 households for Hamburg and 4 households for Munich, respectively. As the wage
diﬀerences between nests are relatively large, the results in Table 4.6 provide much more
insights regarding the eﬀect of the minimum wage on the center–periphery system within
a labor-market region. Given that the choice of labor-market region is ﬁxed, the minimum
wage of e 7.50 leads to an average reduction of households that choose to live and work
in the metropolitan areas of 0.012%. The option to commute to the metropolitan area is
chosen 0.004% less. The relative stronger growth of wages in the nonmetropolitan areas
leads to an increase in the number of households that choose to work there: The number
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of choices in favor of living and working in the periphery (living in the metro area and
working in the periphery) increases by 0.026% (0.017%). In total, we see a slight popula-
tion gain for nonmetropolitan areas (0.014%), while metropolitan area population drops
by 0.009%. Furthermore, the introduction of the minimum wage leads to an increase in
the overall number of commuters of 0.002%.
As in the previous scenario, I use simulation techniques to estimate the individual willing-
ness to pay for the introduction of the minimum wage according to equation (4.12). The
average compensating variation associated with the introduction of a minimum wage of
e 7.50 is e 0.10. Note, that this ﬁgure is positive since this simulation does not account for
possible employment eﬀects. In fact, the simulation assumes that wages at each alternative
are independent of employment at that alternative.
While it is clear that the present model can only predict household behavior and has no
power to consider any equilibrium eﬀects determined through the interplay with the pro-
duction sector, another important caveat has to be kept in mind regarding the simulated
eﬀects. Similarly, any adjustments on the housing markets provoked by shifts in the popu-
lation are not incorporated in the model. The same is true for possible nonlinear congestion
eﬀects on commuting time.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper empirically quantiﬁes the eﬀects of wages, housing costs, and commuting time
on the joint residential and job location choice of households. Applying discrete choice
methods to a large set of micro-data allows a comprehensive empirical analysis of the three
most important economic determinants of location choice. The analysis focuses on the
household’s decision to live and work either in the central metropolitan area, or the sur-
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rounding nonmetropolitan area, or to commute between the two. Objects of investigation
are the regional labor markets constituted by the urban centers of the largest German cities
Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich. A mixed logit approach is employed where coeﬃcients are
allowed to vary randomly over decision makers instead of being constant. This estimation
strategy avoids the restrictive IIA assumption that is implicit in simple multinomial logit
estimation. Moreover, arbitrary correlation patterns of coeﬃcients are explicitly allowed
for as correlation between tastes for the alternatives is very likely in the adopted choice
setting.
The estimates fully conﬁrm the important role of wages, housing costs, and commuting
time for individual location choice, as predicted by economic theory. However, the results
show that tastes for commuting time and housing costs do vary substantially within the
population. Estimated elasticities show how changes in wages, housing costs, or commut-
ing time aﬀect the distribution of households between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan
areas. Interestingly, there are no systematic diﬀerences in the magnitude of the impacts
between the three factors. However, the eﬀects of the economic determinants do vary over
alternatives. To illustrate the quantitative implications of these results, two counterfac-
tual scenarios are predicted. Accordingly, a general 10% cut in the wages of commuters
would lead to an increase in urban population of 0.09% and a decrease in the population of
nonmetropolitan areas of 0.14%. Total commuting decreases by almost 2%. Furthermore,
the introduction of a uniform minimum wage of e 7.50 leads to a decrease (increase) of
urban (rural) population of 0.009% (0.014%). In addition, both political measures result
in minor shifts of the population between the three labor market-regions. The estimated
overall willingness to pay to avoid the wage drop amounts to e 2.28, while the change in
consumer surplus associated with the minimum wage of e 7.50 is e 0.10.
Economic theory also emphasizes the role of local amenities for the household’s location
choice. The present study captures such eﬀects by alternative- and region speciﬁc ﬁxed
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eﬀects only. Any particular amenities are not explicitly addressed due to the excessive time
cost and technical limits that are implied by the computational complexity of the applied
estimation method. However, the estimation of willingness-to-pay ﬁgures for local ameni-
ties using appropriate, simulation based discrete choice methods remains a worthwhile aim
for future research.
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Appendix A: Counties of the (Non)Metropolitan Areas
Labor-market region of Hamburg:
∙ Metropolitan Area: Urban county of Hamburg (Kreisfreie Stadt Hamburg).
∙ Nonmetropolitan Area: Counties (Landkreise) Harburg, Rotenburg (Wu¨mme),
Stade, Herzogtum Lauenburg, Pinneberg, Segeberg, Stormarn.
Labor-market region of Berlin:
∙ Metropolitan Area: Urban county of Berlin (Kreisfreie Stadt Berlin).
∙ Nonmetropolitan Area: Urban counties (kreisfreie Sta¨dte) Frankfurt a. d. Oder,
Brandenburg a. d. Havel, Potsdam. Counties (Landkreise) Oberhavel, Barnim,
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Ma¨rkisch Oderland, Oder-Spree, Dahme-Spreewald, Havelland, Potsdam-Mittelmark,
Teltow-Fla¨ming.
Labor-market region of Munich:
∙ Metropolitan Area: Urban county of Munich (Kreisfreie Stadt Mu¨nchen).
∙ Nonmetropolitan Area: Counties (Landkreise) Dachau, Ebersberg, Erding, Freis-
ing, Fu¨rstenfeldbruck, Landsberg a. Lech, Mu¨nchen, Starnberg.
Appendix B: Summary Statistics and Comparative Static
Elasticities
Table A.1: Sample Means by Alternatives 푎: Berlin
Variable 푎 = 푀푀 푎 = 푀푁 푎 = 푁푁 푎 = 푁푀
Location speciﬁc
Commuting Time 33.4 46.4 26.4 51.2
Housing Cost 7.97 7.42 3.32 3.04
Wage 90.1 75.2 72.1 87.6
Individual
Age 40-44 40-44 40-44 40-44
(Age Category) (7.07) (6.48) (6.70) (6.85)
Children .233 .262 .316 .360
Education 11.5 11.7 11.0 11.0
Observations 10848 580 3003 1685
Individual ﬁgures weighted by individual sampling probabilities.
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Table A.2: Sample Means by Alternatives 푎: Hamburg
Variable 푎 = 푀푀 푎 = 푀푁 푎 = 푁푁 푎 = 푁푀
Location speciﬁc
Commuting Time 28.2 36.8 21.3 46.5
Housing Cost 13.9 13.8 4.97 4.24
Wage 99.8 95.5 89.6 104
Individual
Age 40-44 40-44 40-44 40-44
(Age Category) (6.82) (6.59) (7.01) (7.17)
Children .188 .140 .349 .335
Education 11.5 11.4 10.5 10.9
Observations 5460 349 1988 1922
Individual ﬁgures weighted by individual sampling probabilities.
Table A.3: Sample Means by Alternatives 푎: Munich
Variable 푎 = 푀푀 푎 = 푀푁 푎 = 푁푁 푎 = 푁푀
Location speciﬁc
Commuting Time 26.2 32.9 26.8 42.8
Housing Cost 34.0 38.2 15.2 12.3
Wage 108 102 99.0 107
Individual
Age 40-44 40-44 35-39 40-44
(Age Category) (6.54) (6.51) (6.34) (6.79)
Children .187 .162 .262 .233
Education 12.1 12.1 10.8 11.5
Observations 4416 936 3654 2027
Individual ﬁgures weighted by individual sampling probabilities.
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Table A.4: Comparative Static Elasticities
Commuting Time: Hamburg
MM MN NN NM
MM -.321 .002 .017 .025
MN .022 -.261 .018 .011
NN .059 .005 -.755 .024
NM .044 .002 .012 -.821
Commuting Time: Berlin
MM MN NN NM
MM -.705 .010 .145 .061
MN .137 -.846 .068 .020
NN .715 .024 -1.74 .074
NM .262 .006 .064 -1.93
Commuting Time: Munich
MM MN NN NM
MM -.509 .019 .071 .038
MN .069 -.505 .141 .032
NN .096 .049 -.756 .059
NM .064 .014 .069 -1.46
Housing Cost: Hamburg
MM MN NN NM
MM -.237 .002 .007 .005
MN .033 -.243 .013 .004
NN .054 .006 -.220 .006
NM .043 .002 .006 -.148
Housing Cost: Berlin
MM MN NN NM
MM -.205 .003 .020 .004
MN .053 -.237 .015 .002
NN .192 .007 -.225 .006
NM .076 .002 .011 -.150
Housing Cost: Munich
MM MN NN NM
MM -1.08 .035 .068 .019
MN .177 -1.11 .188 .023
NN .209 .106 -.651 .035
NM .108 .025 .062 -.832
Wage: Hamburg
MM MN NN NM
MM .326 -.006 -.041 -.022
MN -.100 .505 -.106 -.019
NN -.125 -.020 .383 -.014
NM -.066 -.004 -.014 .309
Wage: Berlin
MM MN NN NM
MM .245 -.004 -.022 -.011
MN -.098 .411 -.042 -.007
NN -.104 -.009 .306 -.006
NM -.069 -.002 -.008 .371
Wage: Munich
MM MN NN NM
MM .425 -.019 -.057 -.012
MN -.090 .494 -.167 -.016
NN -.075 -.045 .362 -.014
NM -.032 -.009 -.025 .356
Calculations based on estimates reported in column 3 of Table 4.2. Individual elas-
ticities are simulated using 100 Halton draws.
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